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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomic theory. The first two concern meth-
ods of modeling bounded rationality and unawareness, while the third applies a model of jointly
determined reputation to incentive problems in the market for expert advice.
Increases in awareness information can be associated with dramatic increases in certainty
or uncertainty. The first chapter of this dissertation seeks to unify both phenomena under a
single framework of epistemic negligence, or errors in an agent's epistemic relation to tautological
beliefs. It is shown that impossible possible worlds (excess uncertainty) result from a failure
to believe all tautologies, while possible impossible worlds (excess certainty) result from belief
in 'tautologies' which may in fact be false. A propositional model is employed throughout
the paper, and several of its properties are compared to the standard state-space model, which
implicitly assumes that epistemic negligence does not exist.
Chapter 2 continues to work with a propositional model of knowledge, focusing more closely
on agents who fail to take into account all relevant dimensions of uncertainty. We show that
in such a setting, if agents' learning makes them better off over time, then (1) they may suffer
from delusion, but only in a proscribed way that is consistent over time, and (2) contrary to
standard conceptions of learning, it is possible for them to rule in 'states of the world' that they
had previously ruled out, because by doing so they increasingly avoid overconfident mistakes.
As a separate concern, and in light of recent corporate scandals, chapter 3 develops a theo-
retical model designed to address the question of whether reputational concerns can discipline
providers of expert advice to exert costly but accuracy-enhancing effort. The primary finding
of the paper is that the effort exerted by an expert can be highly sensitive to whether its rep-
utation is determined by its effort alone or whether the firm it is evaluating also has a costly
action available to it, by which it too can influence the expert's reputation for accuracy. We
characterize equilibria in these two settings, and they are found to differ in several interesting
ways, which shed some light on the concerns of federal authorities that credit rating agencies
applied insufficient effort to their evaluation of firms such as Enron.
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Chapter 1
Epistemic Negligence: Tautological
Beliefs and Logical Omniscience in a
Propositional Model
1.1 Introduction
The concepts of unawareness and unforeseen contingencies have received increasing attention
from economists in recent years, and yet it has not always been clear what the literature seeks
to understand. It seems intuitively clear that an agent, newly aware of some fact or question,
could become either more certain about the world, realizing that the information she already
has is sufficient to make an informed decision - or less, realizing that what she thought was
ironclad proof of some fact is dubious or even irrelevant. Standard state space models have
been shown inadequate to study the question (Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a)), but
augmented versions of these models have focused on two types of irrationality. This paper
seeks to provide a framework, within a propositional model, that unifies the two.
First, real agents often do not know all the logical implications of what they do know: they
are not logically omniscient.1 But in a state space model in which the agent can accurately
describe all of the states of the world, if an event E (defined as a set of states, naturally thought
1'As Lipman (1999) points out, 'the common criticism that real agents cannot compute the optimal action in
a complex model is precisely a statement that real agents are not logically omniscient.'
of as the set of states in which a particular proposition is true) implies another event F, and
the agent knows E is true, he must also know F is true. For example, if the agent knows the
axioms and rules of inference of set theory, he must also know all of the theorems of set theory.
Second, real agents are often unaware of contingencies, giving them a truncated view of the
possible states. This sort of error, a failure to ask decision-relevant questions, has been called
a lack of Type 2 logical omniscience by philosophers and truncated awareness information by
economists. Full awareness information is implied by the standard state space model: an
agent may place zero probability on an event, but he never simply leaves it out of consideration
altogether.
These two mistakes are, in a sense, mirror images of one another. An agent who is not
logically omniscient fails to recognize logical implications; one with truncated awareness infor-
mation may believe in implications which do not really hold, epistemically 'living' in a region
of the state space in which they do. The former views his world with too much uncertainty,
allowing for contingencies which never obtain - what Lipman (1999) calls impossible possible
worlds. The latter is overly confident, ruling out contingencies that are possible - we will call
this possible impossible worlds, or excess certainty. The former includes more states than truly
exist in his subjective view of the state space, while the latter includes too few.
The aim of this paper is to provide a better understanding of these errors, and the behavior
associated with them, by unifying them under a single framework. Both types of errors will be
shown to be a special case of a phenomenon we will label epistemic negligence, which pertains to
how an agent interacts with tautologies. To say that the standard model assumes no epistemic
negligence means that it assumes that agents interact properly with tautologies: in all states
of the world they believe that all tautologies are true, and there is nothing that they believe
in all states of the world which is not, in fact, tautologically true. It is tempting to believe
that these two assumptions can be reduced to one, but as will be shown, they are in fact
independent - at least within a state space model or the propositional model employed in this
paper. We will show also that violations of these two assumptions are, respectively, equivalent
to the two types of error we have described. An agent who does not believe all tautologies is
one for whom impossible worlds are considered possible, who is overly uncertain, who does not
recognize the logical implications of his knowledge. An agent who believes in all states of the
world propositions which are not tautologies, on the other hand, is one for whom possible worlds
may be considered impossible, who is overly certain, who believes that logical implications hold
which may nriot. If either mistake is made, we say that the agent is epistemically negligent.
An example may help to clarify the issues which are considered in this paper. Suppose
you are about to start your car, and consider the proposition 'the car will start when the key
is turned in the ignition'. On the one had, suppose that you believe the the proposition is
tautologically true - i.e., that it holds regardless of what else is true - but that, in fact, it is
not. You are, for example, unaware of the question of whether the battery is dead or not, and
behave as if you take for granted that it never is. In this case you are overly confident, taking
for granted logical implications which do not universally hold. Your lack of awareness of the
battery has introduced excess certainty to your beliefs. On the other hand, if the situation is
reversed - if this proposition is tautologically true, but you consider it possible that it is false -
then you will fail to be logically omniscient. In this case, no matter how certain you are that
you will turn the key in the ignition, you are erroneously unsure that the car will start. Your
failure to believe all tautologies has introduced excess uncertainty to your beliefs.
The model of the paper is similar to standard models of knowledge used in game theory, but
with propositions rather than states as the objects of belief. After a brief discussion comparing
properties of the model in this paper with the standard state-space model, we introduce the
notion of 'evident propositions'. These are, simply, those which can be 'seen'; they are the
data available to the agent, from which he infers his beliefs about what other propositions are
possible and/or true. The key assumption in this approach is that if two states of the world
look the same to an agent, then his preferences and beliefs must be the same in each. We
employ this approach to arrive at two main results. First, in order to relate the current paper
to the work of Lipman (1999), we show that when epistemic negligence manifests itself as a
failure to believe in all tautologies, the result is impossible possible worlds, or a failure of logical
omniscience. On the other hand, when epistemic negligence takes the form of a belief that
some proposition is true in every state of the world which is not, in fact, a tautology, the result
is excess certainty, the unwarranted ruling out of states which are, in fact, possible or even true
- that is, delusion. These two different 'mistakes' with respect to tautologies are, in a sense,
opposites, and give rise to mistakes that are opposites.
Having provided this framework, we go on to explore properties of the propositional model
employed in this paper. We show that whereas belief in impossible possible worlds can be rep-
resented quite naturally in this model, there is no 'normal' belief operator which can represent
such beliefs in a standard state space model. This is not, we argue, necessarily a difference
between a state space and a propositional model, however; rather, it depends on whether the
beliefs of the agent are required to range only over what can objectively be true. Lipman
(1999), for example, has worked within a state space model without this restriction. Finally,
we show that while unawareness is often depicted as a violation of negative introspection (in
which an agent knows what he does not know), the epistemic negligence of this paper, which
seems to capture much of what is meant by unawareness, need not violate this property. It
may, on the other hand, violate nondelusion: an agent who rules out states which are possible
holds a false belief.
The literature on unawareness, which considers issues very near to those in this paper, has
been growing recently. Kreps (1979, 1992) first provided a decision theoretic model of un-
foreseen contingencies, and Geanakoplos (1989) was one of the first to consider relaxing the
assumptions of the state space model which, as Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) have
shown, preclude unawareness. Outside the field of economics, researchers in artificial intelli-
gence (Fagin and Halpern (1988), Halpern (2001), Lam (2001)) and epistemology (Gardenfors
(1988), Horty (2005)) have explicitly considered not only unawareness but how the set of ques-
tions asked by an agent may evolve. More recently models of knowledge which allow for
unawareness and the asking of new questions have been explored by Modica and Rustichini
(1994, 1999), Feinberg (2004a, 2004b, 2004c), Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2004), and Li
(2003). These have focused explicitly on modeling static knowledge in which unawareness is
possible, but have not explored a process by which awareness information may endogenously
be gained. Neither has any of the literature of which I know unified the two types of epistemic
negligence, or of logical omniscience, under a single framework, as this paper does in linking
both to agents' epistemic relationship to tautologies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, comparing it to
the standard state space model used in most of the game theoretic literature on knowledge and
learning. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of evident propositions and the assumption
that if two states 'look' the same, then preferences and beliefs must be the same in each. Several
results of this assumption are presented. Section 4 defines the two types of epistemic negligence
and characterizes them in terms of excess uncertainty and excess certainty; we then examine
properties of the propositional model, allowing for epistemic negligence. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Notation and the Model
1.2.1 Primitives
The primitives of the model are a set of propositions and a set of states, together with a
correspondence between them. Propositions, defined formally below, are statements that
describe some aspect of the world and of which the agent may have awareness and/or knowledge.
In a typical state space model, the agent's beliefs pertain to what states of the world are possible
and/or true; propositions are only indirectly referenced, as in the definition of a state as a
'complete and logically consistent description of a way the world might be.' One advantage
of such a model is that we can say a great deal about the agent's learning process merely by
referencing the states which he thinks possible. If we know that the agent thinks a given state
possible, then we know he considers all propositions describing the state possible. On the
other hand, if we know that the agent considers possible all states whose description includes
a particular proposition, then we can immediately infer further information about the agent's
beliefs regarding the other propositions that describe that set of states.
This advantage does not come without a cost, of course. If the agent views uncertainty as
a state space, then he knows how to group propositions together correctly into complete and
consistent descriptions of the ways the world might be. This is one way of expressing the fact
that typical state space models assume both types of logical omniscience. If we wish to drop
this assumption, we must allow for the agent not to understand how propositions should be
grouped into descriptions of states. The approach adopted here is to take the agent's beliefs
about propositions, rather than states, as primitive, with minimal assumptions about how these
beliefs map to the objective state space. In principle, this allows us to model learning behavior
without logical omniscience. As we shall see, the predictions the model makes depend on what
we assume about the agent's epistemic relationship to tautologies.
Propositions
Assume a finite set of letters A, with typical elements a, r, etc., and the symbols A, -, (, and
). These symbols are taken as exogenously given and fixed throughout.
Let S denote the set of strings generated from A by finite application of the following three
rules in any sequence:
1. Every letter belonging to A is a string.
2. If a and T are strings, then so is (a) A (7).
3. If a is a proposition, then so is -i(a).
In what follows, we omit the parentheses when there is no risk of confusion. We also use
a Vr as an abbreviation for -1(-aA A-T), ¢ --+ r as an abbreviation for -(a A --r) (or, equivalently,
-a V T), and a -+• r as an abbreviation for (a --+ r) A (0 -- r). 2
We use these strings to model statements describing aspects of the world. It is not appealing,
however, merely to identify the set of propositions D with the set of strings S (or to cut out
the definition of strings and simply define propositions as we define strings above). If we were
to do so, a question would arise at this point about propositions which are syntactially distinct
strings, but which seem to express the same content. 3 For example, if p denotes rain, it seem
clear that -ap and p A p should denote rain as well. Similarly, we would like to model q A V
and V A 0 as being the same proposition, despite being distinct strings. This latter point will
be particularly important when, in the next section (and throughout the paper), we want to
express the statement that all propositions in a set of propositions E C O are true using the
single proposition AE. If 0 A 0 and V A 4 are different propositions - i.e., if the proposition
depends on the order in which the conjunction operator A is applied - then it is not clear that
AE is well-defined. In addition, even starting from a finite set of letters A, S is clearly infinite;
we have only allowed for finite conjunction, and so if E C D is not finite then, once again, AE
is not well-defined.
2 Thus, the set of propositions is closed under disjunction and implication, as well as conjunction, the latter
having been given as Rule 2.
3I am very grateful to Haluk Ergin for pointing this out to me and suggesting the discussion in the rest of
this section.
A common approach to this issue is to identify propositions with their logical content, and
equate logically equivalent propositions to one another. Indeed, this is the approach taken in
a state-space model: whether propositions are only indirectly referenced or explictly 'in the
model' (as in Samet (1990) and Shin (1993)), a set of states can be identifed by any proposition
describing it. If multiple propositions describe the same set of states, then these are regarded
as being equivalent.
If we identify a proposition by its logical content (using standard first-order propositional
logic), then we immediately have that p = -'-p = p A p for all p and that ¢ A O = 0 A ¢ for all
0, 4. However, we also have that 0 V -,0 = O V --4 for all 4, ': all tautologies are equivalent
because they all hold the same logical content (essentially, they are empty of content, since
they hold at all states of the world). If we take this approach, therefore, then any agent that
recognizes one tautology as a tautology must recognize all tautologies as such. But it is just
this assumption which we seek to relax.
For this reason, we take a middle course. We identify a proposition as a set of strings which
are logically equivalent and which consist of the same set of letters from A (plus A and -).
More formally:
Define the equivalence4 relation - across strings to mean that for any s, s' E S, s - s' if
s and s' are logically equivalent according to standard first-order propositional logic. For any
string s, let M8 C A denote the set of letters from which s is constructed (together with the
symbols A and -'). And for any string s, let [s] = {s' E S : s' , s and Ms, = M,}, or 'the
equivalence class of s'.5
Now, we define the set of propositions 4 as the quotient set S/ - of equivalence classes:
S= {[s] : S}.
Note the following about this definition:
* It reflects the assumption that the letters bear meaning, and allows for agents who may
believe that some proposition is true, and yet fail to believe another proposition with the
same logical content, but expressed in a different way.
4I.e., it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
5Note that were we to replace 'MW, = MW' with 'MW, C M.' (i.e., such that strings constructed from a subset
of the letters in s belong to [s]), these would not be equivalence classes because the relation identifying pairs
that belong to the same class would not be transitive.
* It does not completely relax the assumption that agents recognize logical equivalence
across propositions: so long as two logically equivalent strings are constructed from the
same set of letters from A, they are modeled as the same proposition and will be treated
as such by the agent in this paper. Of course, the current approach is motivated by
the fact that we don't want to completely drop the assumption that logical equivalence is
recognized. For example:
* Under this approach, the strings €, -i--io and ¢Aq are all modeled as the same proposition,
and are therefore recognized as equivalent by the agent. However, the agent need not
recognize that 0 V -0 and 0 V -iV are equivalent ways of describing the full state space.
Neither need he recognize the equivalance of any proposition ¢ and € A (4 V -¢), as 0
may be something of which he is unaware.
It is immediate from the construction that for all 4, 4 E 4, s, s' E 4, t, t' e 4, one has
s A t , s' A t', -Is ~ -s', and Ms U Mt = M,1 U Mt,. Hence, the operations of conjuction and
negation (and therefore disjunction and material implication as well) can naturally be extended
from strings to propositions. In the sequel, we abuse language and refer to a proposition as
a description of some aspect of the way the world may be, when in fact it consists of a set of
such descriptions, all logically equivalent to one another. Moreover, we denote by MO the set
of letters from A from which all strings in the equivalence class 4 are constructed.
Finally, note that in this model the set of propositions is finite.6
SThis is easier to see in the following equivalent way of modeling propositions, which is more concise but less
transparent than that presented in the text.
Define the set of propositions 4 as the set of pairs 0 = {(M, f)}, where M C A is a nonempty subset of letters
in A denoting the domain of 0 and f : {0, 1}M -- {0, 1} is a function mapping vectors of truth values for the
letters in M onto truth values for the proposition.
Further, define the operators -, and A on the set of propositions:
If = (M,f) and V = (M',g), then -4 = (M, 1 - f) and A = (MUM', f *g).
The operators V and -- are defined as abbreviations as previously.
The identification of each proposition with a set of truth values for a subset of A is equivalent to the definition
given in the text, which identifies each proposition with the set of logically equivalent strings constructed of the
same subset of A. Moreover, as there are a finite number of subsets of A, and therefore a finite number of
distinct functions mapping these subsets onto truth values, it is clear that the set of propositions is a finite set.
States
Each proposition is interpreted as describing some aspect of the way the world may be. There
is also a set of states of the world, R, with typical element w e Q. As usual, this is defined
as the set of complete and logically consistent descriptions of ways the world might be. As
such, we identify each state as a unique set of propositions P, C o, which is simply the set of
propositions which are true at state w.7 By definition, , = ~ w = w'. We assume the
following about each D,:
1. For every ¢ E P and for every w E Q, exactly one of the pair €, -i belongs to ,. We
call the assumption that at least one of the pair belongs to 4, maximality; we call the
assumption that only one of this pair belongs to 4, consistency.
2. For every w E Q, € and 0 both belong to D, if and only if q A 0 belongs to 4P.
Recalling how the connective V is defined from A and -', these two assumptions imply that
for every w e Q, if € E 4P, then, for any other 0 e (, ¢ V 4 belongs to 4,. Conversely, for
every w e Q, if q V 4 e D,, then 0 or 4 must belong to 4, (where 'or' is not exclusive).
Each state can then be fully described as the state where the propositions in D, are true
and those in 4\#, are false.
We associate the state space Q with the set {1 }En. For each w e Q, we denote by the
proposition A,, the conjunction of all propositions associated with state w. 9
Note that logical relations among propositions (other than 0 and -¢) are given 'empirically',
by the exogenous objective state space. In particular, in this paper we define a tautology as a
proposition which is true in every state of the world. To say that q -+ 4 is a tautology, that is,
means no more and no less than that there exists no state w such that both € and -vi? belong
to 4, (notice that, from the above definitions of the connectives, 
€ --+ V is equivalent to -'(o A
7The first to have defined states from propositions in this way appears to have been Samet (1990).
8Shin (1993), following Samet (1990), gives an alternate construction of states, in which states of the world
are defined as those members w of the set {0, 1}* which satisfy w (¢) + w (-,0) = 1 and w(¢ A V) = w(O)w (0).
That is, states are vectors of assignments of truth values to the propositions, restricted in a way analogous to
the two restrictions we have placed on the set {4}en.
9Note that A4P returns the same proposition regardless of the order in which conjunction is carried out across
the propositions in ,,.
-,). 10 In allowing for epistemic negligence we are explicitly dropping the assumption that the
agent necessarily understands that any such relationship does or does not exist. In Aumann's
terminology, while the set of tautologies is logically closed (containing all logical consequences
of its members, using modus ponens11 as the rule of inference), it is not epistemically closed
(the agent does not necessarily know all propositions which are tautologies); as we shall see,
it is this relaxation of the standard model's assumptions which allows for impossible possible
worlds and for possible impossible worlds. We shall also see below an example of a family of
sets of propositions which are epistemically closed - namely, the sets of evident propositions
true at each state.
1.2.2 Beliefs
In considering the beliefs of the agent, I retain the notion of a possibility correspondence, but
alter its definition from the standard one. In particular, my possibility correspondence P is a
mapping from states of the world to propositions considered possible at that state: P : --+ 21'.
Then we write ¢ E P(w) to mean that q is considered possible when the true state is w. Note
that P(w) depends only on w, the state of the world, so that a change in what is considered
possible entails a change in the state. 12  We assume that P (w) 0 for all w e Q; the agent
always considers something possible. Moreover, we assume that:
* if q Vb E P(w), then 0 E P(w) or ¢ E P(w)
* if 0 C P(w), then 0 V V E P(w), for all b E D such that MO = M
* if AO E P(w), then E P(w) and 0 E P(w)
Note that the conjunction 0 A O need not be considered possible whenever € and V are
individually considered possible.
10Aumann (1999) has shown that, in a syntactical model of knowledge such as that of this paper (with the
appropriate mapping to a csemantic state-space model; see Aumann (1999) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(1998a)), a proposition satisfies the definition of tautology in first-order logic if and only if it is true in every
state of the world. The focus of this paper is not, however, on the logical properties of tautologies (or any other
proposition), but on the agent's epistemic relationship to the propositions describing states of the world, with
special emphasis (see below) on those propositions which are always true.
11 This means that a set of propositions is logically closed just in case it satisfies the following: if the propositions
0 and ¢ -- 0 belong to the set, then 0 must belong to the set as well.
12 It is possible to include propositions that explicitly describe the beliefs of the agent - i.e., to employ a modal
logic. Aumann (1999) and Samet (1990) are two papers which do this; we do not need this extra structure here.
Note the following differences between (P, the set of propositions which are true at w, and
P (w), the set of propositions which are considered possible at w. It should be clear that in
general, the fact that any proposition belongs to 4), need not imply anything about P(w).13
More importantly, unlike what we assumed about 4,, we do not assume that exactly one of
the pair (q, --€) must belong to P (w) for all q e 4. It is key to keep this in mind to avoid
confusion regarding the above three properties. In particular, the reader may wonder if they
are truly independent assumptions. If we were to rule out cases in which neither q nor -0 is
considered possible (we will do so shortly) and also cases in which both are (we will never rule
these out) then the first property above would follow from the third (similarly to our earlier
characterization of 4P). But because we allow the agent to consider both 0 and -q possible
(which simply means that he does not know which is true), the three properties are indeed
independent.
A second difference between D, and P(w) is that whereas the set of propositions which
belong to 4, depends only on their logical content - they describe the state as it objectively
is - this is not the case for P(w). The propositions which are considered possible depend also
on the letters of which they are constructed (as noted in the second property above). 4  For
example, it follows from the third property of P(w) described above that if 0 logically implies
0 and M0 c; MO, then 0 is considered possible whenever 0 is considered possible (because in
this case the strings 0 and 0 A O are in the same equivalence class and therefore modeled as
the same proposition), but this need not be the case if MO C M,.
Note as well that the first two properties, of course, can be written in terms of A and -
(the connectives which are 'really' in the model, as opposed to V, which is an abbreviation):
the first would then read, 'if -(0 A --p) e P(w), then 4 E P (w) or E P (w).' I choose to
present the first two properties in terms of V simply for ease of interpretation.
What is the analog in our model to the statement that some state w' is considered possible?
This would be the case at state w when for every ¢ e 4 ,y, E e P(w), that is, when 4)", C P(w).
In other words, when every proposition true at state w' is considered possible, we would say
13The exception will be 'evident propositions' which will be defined below.
14Again, though we do not need the extra structure here, it would be possible for a modal logic to include
propositions at the various states describing which syntactic expressions of a given proposition are considered
possible and which are not, such that P(w) continues to depend only on w.
that the state itself is considered possible. This, however, should be taken as representing a
statement by the modeler, and not necessarily the agent, because we are not assuming that the
agent knows that state w' is described by the set of propositions (D, or even that she conceives
of state w' at all.
The translation of the standard state-space definition of beliefs from the possibility corre-
spondence is as follows:
Definition 1 The operator B : 4 --+ 2 represents the possibility correspondence P if, for all
SE 4:DI
B(O) = {w E : P(w)}15
In other words, B represents P just in case the set of states at which a proposition is believed
is the same as the set of states at which the proposition's negation is not considered possible.
What about cases of epistemic negligence? If the agent has not considered some proposition
at all, can he consider it possible? Can he consider its negation possible? If he can do
neither, then (following the preceding paragraph) does he believe both? Later in the paper we
will discuss the connection between epistemic negligence and negative introspection (roughly,
knowing that you do not know something, a property which is often thought unawareness must
violate, for how could you know anything about something of which you are unaware, even that
you do not know it?). For now, we note only that we will assume that it is never the case that
an agent believes both a proposition and its negation. This assumption is discussed at greater
length in Barczi (2007).
To be more formal, let us make the following assumption about P, which we will call non-
triviality (NT):
(NT) For all ¢, E ), B(O) n {we Q: E P(w)} C_ {w E Q: A V E P(w)}.16
In words, NT says that if ¢ is believed, and any other proposition is considered possible,
then the conjunction of that proposition with ¢ must also be considered possible. For example,
"'Morris similarly shows, in a state space model with events E and F, that a normal belief operator - one
which satisfies B(2) = n and B(E n F) = B(E) n B(F), a topic to which we will return below - represents a
possibility correspondence constructed from it by P(w) = {w' :w 0 B(-{w'})}.
1 6 Note that NT represents a further assumption on P: it may be written as 'For all 4, V E 4, {w E : -'0
P(w)} n {w E :' E P(w)} C {w E fl: 0 A 4 E P(w)}.'
if I believe that today is Thursday, and also consider it possible that the date is March 1, then
I must consider it possible that today is Thursday, March 1. We will assume that NT holds in
the rest of the paper. Note that the right-hand side is a subset of {w E : Q E P(w)}, and so
one implication of this assumption is that if q is believed, then it is considered possible, and not
only trivially 'believed'. We have assumed that P(w) is never empty, and so this assumption
implies that belief will only be of the non-trivial sort; moreover, when the only member of
P(w) is q, wE B(O) together with NT implies nothing beyond this non-triviality. The added
content of this assumption obtains when some other proposition V is considered possible at
w E B(4), in which case the assumption says that the conjunction 4 A V is considered possible
as well. This is intuitive: if ¢ is believed, then any other proposition which is considered
possible must be believed to be compatible with 0 - if 0 A O were not considered possible, then
the belief that q should preclude the possibility that 0.
With this in mind, the following proposition is quite natural:
Proposition 2 NT holds for all w E 2 if and only if B(O -+ o) n B(0) C B(') for all 0, V.
Proof. For any subset E C Q, write E c to denote Q/E, the set complement of E with
respect to Q.
First, suppose that NT holds: B(4) n {w E : 4 E P(w)} C {w E Q : 0 A V E P(w)}.
Suppose further that at some state w', -V) is considered possible, and that ¢ is believed, so that
W' E B(4) n {w E : -'4 e P(w)}. Then, by assumption, w' E {w E Q" A--, E P(w)}:
the conjunction 0 A -' is considered possible. This, of course is equivalent to saying that
W' B(O -+ 4): it is not believed that 4 implies 4. To sum up, we have shown that
under our assumption, B(o) {w E Q : -0 E P(w)} C [B( -- )]c. This is equivalent to
B(0 -* 4) C [B(0)] c U B(0), or B(0 -- 4) n B() C B(O), as was to be shown.
For the other direction, note that in the first part of the proof we have shown already that
4B( • ) n B(4) C B(4') is equivalent to B(o) 0 {w : -04 E P(w)} C {w E 2 : 0 A -'4 E
P(w)}. Since this holds for all 0, 4 E 1b, and every proposition can be written as the negation
of another, this is in turn equivalent to the property that B(O) nl {w E : p E P(W)} C {W C
2 : A p E P(w)} for all ¢, p E 4, which is NT. m
Note again the implication of this proposition: if we assume (with Frank Ramsey (1930))
that agents reason in such a way that whenever they believe q -+ 0, and they believe q, they
also believe 'b, then we implicitly assume that beliefs are held non-trivially, since an implication
of NT is that B(O) C {we Q : " E P(w)}. The only way this can fail to hold is if we drop our
assumption that P(w) is non-empty for all w;17 if we drop this assumption, however, we allow
for states at which nothing is considered possible and everything is believed. The reason that
we assume NT and not the weaker B(O) C {w E Q : E P(w)} is that we will be assuming
Ramsey reasoning at various points in the paper, and so we may as well make clear the added
content of our assumptions captured by NT.
NT is the first of two major assumptions we make in this model, restricting our focus to
agents who, whatever their epistemic negligence, cannot believe both a proposition and its
negation; we simultaneously restrict ourselves to agents who reason in the manner described
above: if they believe q -+ V and come to learn that 0, they conclude that 0. The second
major assumption is the subject of the next section of the paper: it says that agents reason
from what they can observe, and must therefore have the same beliefs in any two states which
look identical to them.
1.3 Evident Propositions
We assume that the primary way the agent forms his beliefs and preferences is on the basis of
what he can observe - and that he does so in a 'consistent' way. First, then, we must define
what is meant by 'what the agent can observe.'
Definition 3 The set of evident propositions L C 4 is defined as the set of propositions satis-
fying the following two properties:
1. If l E L, --Il E L.
2. If l E L n D,, then w E B(1).
17Note that, so long as P (w) 7- 0 for all w E 0, some proposition is considered possible at every state at which
0 is believed, for any E 4I). If this proposition is 4 for a particular w' E B(O), then 4 A 4 E P(w'), and thus
0 E P(w'). The same argument holds for all w E B(O).
For simplicity we write L, - Ln f ,.
The interpretation is that these are the facts about the state of the world which can be
'seen'; they are the data upon which the agent bases his view of the world, so that the truth
value of any other proposition and all preferences must be inferred from these. We assume
that the set of evident propositions is nonempty, and that it is constant for a given agent, with
no dependence on the state of the world. Note that the fact that L is nonempty together with
the first part of its definition imply that L, is nonempty for all w E Q; the agent can always
'see' something.
The major assumption which we make is the following:
Assumption: for all w,w' E Q, LL = L,, - P(w) = P(w').
In words, our assumption says that two states look the same to the agent if and only if he
has the same beliefs in those two states. The assumption imposes consistency on the beliefs of
the agent across states which are indistinguishable to him.
Similar to the proposition A,, we will denote the proposition AL" the conjunction of all
evident propositions true at state w. 18 Moreover, for simplicity I will often write the conjunction
of 4 and every proposition in the set L, as 4 A L, where there is no risk of confusion as to this
term's meaning.
I now show that an agent, at some state w, considers possible the evident propositions which
characterize his view of some other state w' if and only if his view of that state and of the true
state are identical. This is intuitively very clear: since an agent can see the truth value of any
evident proposition, he only considers one of them possible when it is in fact true. Thus, if he
considers possible evident propositions which characterize some state other than the true one,
it can only be that these propositions are in fact true both in that state and the true one.
Proposition 4 L, C P(w') < L, = L,
Proof. The 'if' direction (<=) is trivial: L,,, c P(w') by definition.
For 'only if' (=), we will first show that L, C P(w') =* L, g L,,,. Suppose to the contrary
that there is some 4 e L,, 4 ý L,,. Because the truth value of any evident proposition of
18 As with AD,, AL, returns the same proposition regardless of the order in which conjunction is applied to
the propositions in L,.
which the agent is aware is always known, by definition, this implies that -10 E Lw,. Then we
have w' e B(-0) =:. 4 V P(w') == L, Z P(w').
Now we will show the other set inclusion: L, C P(w') =* L, D L,,. Similar to the last
paragraph, we have that 4 e L,;, q V L,) = -0 e L,. Then by hypothesis we have -10 E P(w').
This, however, contradicts our assumption that ¢ E Lo,. m
In other words, the observable data associated with one state are considered possible at
another state if and only if those two states look the same to the agent.
We can extend this idea to non-evident propositions as well. The following result, which
follows immediately from the previous one, simply re-expresses our assumption that when two
states look the same to the agent, any proposition considered possible at one is considered
possible at another.
Proposition 5 Vw, w' e 01, 4 A L, E P(w') =~4 e P(w).
Proof. 4 A L, E P(w') implies, by Proposition 2 and the assumption that 4 A 0 E P(w) =
E P(w) and 0 E P(w), that L, = L,t. This in turn implies that P(w) = P(w'), and thus
that 4 E P(w). M
Note that we did not assume that 4 E 4,. But if this is the case, and at the same time
4 is not considered possible (this is 'delusion', defined more formally below), then Proposition
3 implies that 4 A L,, P(w') for all w'; in other words, delusion at one state implies that
whatever is evident at that state is never thought compatible with the proposition about which
one is deluded. In fact, the two are equivalent:
Proposition 6 4 0 P(w) ý* C B(L,, -- --4)
Proof. We have already proved that 4 A L, E P(w') = 4 e P(w), which is sufficient
to prove that 4 V P(w) =* Q C B(L,, --+ -0). For the other direction, note that the right
hand side of the equivalence implies that Vw e f, w E B(L,, --+ ,) = B(-n(L,, A 4)), which is
equivalent to L, A 4 V P(w), which implies (by NT) that 4 V P(w), as was to be shown. m
This can be interpreted as formalizing what we have said about 'taking for granted'. Re-
turning to our example about starting the car, the proposition says that if in one state of the
world you believe, on the basis of no evidence particular to that state of the world, that turning
the key will start your car, then you will always believe that turning the key will start your
car. Implicitly, you assume that there is no other information you need - such as the current
state of your car battery - to allow you to infer from the fact that you will turn the key that
your car will start.
The results of this section have described the features of the propositional model that we will
need to explore more deeply how the agent's epistemic relationship to tautologies determines
whether he exhibits epistemic negligence, and the form it takes.
1.4 Impossible Possible Worlds, Possible Impossible Worlds,
and Tautologies
1.4.1 Epistemic Negligence
How can we relate the error of ruling states out when they should be considered possible to that
in which states that never occur are given positive weight? Intuitively, it seems that becoming
aware of a proposition could have one of two seemingly opposite effects. On the one hand, it
may be possible to become aware of a dimension of uncertainty that one had been neglecting,
treating it either as irrelevant or as trivially decided in one way or the other. To realize this
error means becoming less certain about the world and realizing that implications that one
thought true may, in fact, not hold. On the other, gaining awareness information may mean
realizing that one has not even asked if some implication holds, and realizing that it does - and
therefore, that one knows more than previously realized. 19 Is there any sense in which these
two are related?
In fact, both of these can be characterized as different types of epistemic negligence, a term
which we use to define an erroneous relationship to tautologies - either failing to believe a
tautology in all states of the world, or believing that a proposition is always true which is not
really tautological. Beyond this connection, however, they are two independent types of errors.
The flexibility of the propositional model employed in this paper allows for these two types
19 This is a familiar experience from solving mathematical proofs. Indeed, there is a sense in which this
characterizes the solving of all proofs. Because a proof simply expresses a series of logical implications from
hypothesis to conclusion, finding a proof is precisely a matter of realizing that implications hold which allow one
to infer from what one assumes (hypothesis) a previously unknown implication of that assumption (conclusion).
of irrationality, which are ruled out by the standard state space model. Each represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the state space itself.
Definition 7 The agent suffers from the impossible possible worlds fallacy if, for some
AE ( such that A (D, for all w E Q, and for some w' E Q, A E P(w').
That is, the agent considers possible at some state of the world a proposition which never
obtains.
Definition 8 The agent suffers from the possible impossible worlds fallacy if, for some
y E c such that pE E 4), for some w' E Q, p V P(w').
In this case, the agent has ruled out as impossible a proposition which is in fact possible,
even when it is true. We will often refer to this fallacy as excess certainty, to help distinguish
it from impossible possible worlds.
Note the asymmetry: in the case of impossible possible worlds, the agent allows for an
impossible world to be possible, whereas with possible impossible worlds (excess certainty), the
agent considers the true world impossible.
Epistemic negligence is simply the absence of both of these errors:
Definition 9 The agent suffers from epistemic negligence if he suffers either from impossible
possible worlds or from possible impossible worlds.
Before proceeding to the main results of the paper, let us illustrate these concepts by
returning to the example from the introduction in terms of the model. Let us suppose that A
consists of only three letters: k, s, and b. These are given, from the example, the interpretations
'the key is turned', 'the car starts', and 'the battery is charged', respectively. From these are
constructed strings such as k, s, and b themselves, their negations -,k, -'s, and -'b, conjunctions
such as k A s, s A -,b, k A -,s A b, and so on. The propositions consist of the set of equivalence
classes constructed from these strings - so that, for instance k A s and k A s A (s V -,s), being
logically equivalent and being constructed from the same set of letters, are treated as the same
proposition.
There are eight states of the world possible in our example. Each can be characterized by
some element of the product space {k, --k} x {s, -ls} x {b, -b}. The assumption of consistency
means that, if it exists, the state containing the propositions k, s, and b must also contain k A s,
k A b, k A sA b, and so on - but for the purposes of our example, we will simplify by referring
to this state as the set {k, s, b}. Note that we did not assume that every proposition must be
true at some state of the world, so the full state space may be a proper subset of the product
space {k, -k} x {s, -s} x {b, -b}.
To illustrate impossible possible worlds, suppose that the full state space Q1 consists of the
two states {k, s, b} and {--k, --s, b}. In other words, there is no state in which the car battery
is not charged; b is a tautology 20 . Another tautology in this model is b - (k *-* s), and
another, implied by the first two, is k (-+ s. In words, a charged battery implies that the key
is turned if and only if the car starts; because the battery is always charged, it is tautologically
the case that the key is turned if and only if the car starts. If, walking out to his car, the agent
is not sure that the car will start when he turns the key, he considers possible a proposition
which never obtains - namely, k A -s, which is the negation of k --+ s (an abbreviation, recall, for
-,(k A -,s)). He suffers, by the definition above, from impossible possible worlds; he considers
possible a world which is impossible. But note also that, in the language of the result which
follows, we can equivalently characterize his error as a failure to believe at least one of the
tautologies we noted above. He clearly does not believe k (-+ s; he may or may not believe b
or, on the other hand, b -+ (k *-- s), but we can certainly say that, if his beliefs satisfy NT,
he cannot believe both of them.
To illustrate possible impossible worlds, on the other hand, suppose that b is not tautologi-
cally true: there is a possible world in which the battery is not charged. The full state space
Q2 consists of the four states {k, s, b}, {Ik, --s, b}, {k, -s, -7b}, and {Ik, -s, b}. In two states
the battery is charged and the key is turned if and only if the car starts; in the other two the
battery is dead and the car will not start whether the key is turned or not. Note that although
neither b nor k - s are tautologies, it is still the case that b -4 (k <-+ s) is true in every
state. If, walking out to his car, the agent assumes that when he turns the key, the car will
certainly start, he has ruled out as impossible the possible world {k, -s, -1b}, in which the dead
battery prevents his car from starting when he turns the key. He thus considers impossible the
proposition k A -,s, true at this state, and thus suffers from possible impossible worlds. In the
20Recall that we have defined a tautology merely to be a proposition true in all states of the world.
language of the proposition below, he believes that k -+ s is tautologically true when, in fact,
it is not satisfied at all states of the world.
We now formalize the link between epistemic negligence and the agent's relationship to
tautologies. In particular, we show that each of the two fallacies represents a different kind
of epistemic negligence, each characterized by a different 'mistake' made with regard to beliefs
about tautologies.
Proposition 10 All tautologies are believed at every state of the world if and only if the agent
does not suffer from the impossible possible worlds fallacy.
Proof. If the agent does not suffer from the impossible possible worlds fallacy, then for all
Ae 4 such that A 4), for all w e Q, A 0 P(w) for all w E Q. This is equivalent to the
statement that for all A such that A e 4% for all w E Q, Q = B(A), i.e. that all tautologies are
believed at every state of the world. *
The next result requires us to define the following property of beliefs, which simply says
that an agent believes a proposition only if it is true:
Nondelusion: B(4) C {w E : 0 e Dw}, for all 0 E 4.
Proposition 11 The following three statements are equivalent:
1. All propositions which are believed at every state of the world are tautologies.
2. The agent does not suffer from the possible impossible worlds fallacy (excess certainty).
3. The agent's beliefs satisfy nondelusion.
Proof. [(1) implies (2)] If all propositions which are believed at every state of the world
are tautologies, then any proposition of the form L, -- that is believed at every state must
in fact be true at every state. That is, if Q = B(L, --* 4)== --i 0 P (w), then it must in fact
be the case that L, -- and that -,0 0 (D. Then there can be no p e D such that A e 4D,
for some ' E Q and u ( P(w'), i.e. the agent does not suffer from excess certainty.
[(2) implies (3)] If the agent does not suffer from excess certainty, then for all A E D such
that p e D, for some w e E2, p E P(w'). This rules out delusion, for if the agent is deluded
there must be some w E Q and some q E 4 such that w E B(o), i.e. -¢ 0 P(w), when in fact
ýP ý -0 E 4).
[(3) implies (1)] Under nondelusion, w E B(0) = k E 4D; therefore, Q C B(0) 4 q E P,
for all w E Q, i.e. ¢ must be a tautology. n
The two fallacies are independent: it is not true that nondelusion implies that all tautologies
are believed in all states. For suppose a proposition is true in every state, but is not believed
in every state. This only means that, if ¢ is the proposition, then there is some state w such
that -4 E P(w). If ¢ 0 P(w) as well, then we have contradicted nondelusion (because in this
case 4,, Z P(w)), but this is not required by the assertion that ¢ is not believed. Nondelusion
doesn't rule out uncertainty (and isn't meant to), and so it must be compatible with agents
failing always to believe that which always is true. What nondelusion does rule out is excess
certainty - agents believing that which is false by ruling out that which is true. It is not
possible to express excess certainty as a failure to believe all tautologies. Similarly, it appears
that impossible possible worlds - while it may reflect a 'default belief' that some tautologically
true implication does not hold - cannot be expressed as a deluded belief in a false proposition.
1.4.2 Learning as Ruling Out
An interesting feature of the standard model, in which both forms of epistemic negligence are
absent, is that learning can only take the form of ruling out, such that uncertainty monotonically
decreases over time. To see this, we must first define a learning process in terms of our model.
Define a function A : Q x P -- Q, where A(w, ¢) E Q represents the new state of the world
which obtains when, being in state w, the agent is presented with the fact that 0 is true (we
assume that this transition is deterministic). Having previously considered the propositions in
P(w) possible (and believing the negations of those propositions not in P(w)), his beliefs may
now be represented by the set P(A(w, 0)). Recall that beliefs (i.e., P(w)) depend only on w;
hence, we represent learning as a transition from one state to another.
We restrict this function in two ways:
* E P(w) z -0 ý P(A(w, 4)): if 0 is learned, then ¢ is believed in the new state, so
long as 0 had not been ruled out in state w.
* LA(,,,) = L,: our focus is on learning a new fact while all of the observable data remain
unchanged. 21
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 12 If the agent suffers neither from possible impossible worlds nor from impossible
possible worlds, P(A(w, )) C P(w).
Proof. Suppose the agent is not epistemically negligent, but that P(A(w, €)) ~ P(w). That
is, upon learning that ¢ is true while in state w, he moves to a new state A(w, ), such that all
propositions previously considered possible are still considered possible, but there exists some
proposition 0 such that b ý P(w), but V E P(A(w, 0)). 0 V P(w) is equivalent to w E B(- ),
which implies that Q = B(L, -- -i) by Proposition 4. If this is the case, then the fact that
the agent does not suffer from possible impossible worlds implies that, in fact, L, --+ -0 e D,
for all w E Q. But if the agent also does not suffer from impossible possible worlds, then
he must in all states believe what is tautologically true, so that A(w, ) E B(L, --+ ).
Because LA(w,) = L,, and because A(w, 0) E B(LA(,,O)) by definition, NT implies that
A(w, 0) E B(-n). But this contradicts our hypothesis that 0 E P(A(w, )). m
Note well that, as regards zero probability events, we can interpret this proposition as saying
one of two things. Strictly speaking, a lack of epistemic negligence rules out zero probability
events altogether. The agent cannot observe something which he had ruled out as impossible;
this violates nondelusion and therefore implies excess certainty. Beyond this, the proposition
says that, in the standard model, if the agent is presented with a fact which he had ruled out, he
cannot rule it in. Note that in defining A : Q x 4 - Q, we required that -0 V P(A(w, 0)) (0 is
believed if it is presented to the agent) only when E P(w) (the agent had not previously ruled
0 out). The proposition, together with NT's requirement that anything believed is considered
possible, says that if ¢ P(w), then upon learning q the agent must simply disregard what he
has learned.
What can we say about agents who suffer only from one type of epistemic negligence, and
not the other - i.e., either from impossible possible worlds or from possible impossible worlds?
21 One may object that in a sense, the newly learned fact becomes 'observed' - but this restriction says that
within the model, this is technically not the case. It is more accurate to say not that ¢ is observed, but that
the agent comes to believe that L, ¢ is tautologically true.
In Barczi (2007) it is shown that, when learning makes the agent better off over time, it is
enough that the agent not suffer from possible impossible worlds alone, and hence satisfy
nondelusion, to ensure that his learning always takes the form of ruling information out. And
now we turn to agents who suffer from impossible possible worlds alone, relating the present
work to that of Lipman (1999) and highlighting one of the differences between state space and
propositional models in the process.
1.4.3 Normal Belief Operators and Differences Between State Space and
Propositional Models
In the case of an agent that allows for impossible possible worlds, a difference between the
propositional model used in this paper and the standard state space model becomes apparent.
Recall that in both models there is a possibility correspondence that (a) is representative of
the agent's beliefs, and (b) takes as its argument each of the states. In the state space model,
P(w) is the set of states considered possible at state w, and we say that the belief operator
B : 2- 22 represents P if B(E) = {w : P(w) C E}, where E C Q is an event. In the
propositional model, P (w) is the set of propositions considered possible, and we say that the
belief operator B : -+ 20 represents P if B(O) = {w : --¢ P(w)}.
When an agent allows for impossible possible worlds, it turns out that his beliefs cannot be
represented by a possibility correspondence in the standard state space model; that is, for this
agent, the belief operator B is not what Morris (1996) calls a normal belief operator.
Proposition 13 If an agent allows for impossible possible worlds, there exists no possibility
correspondence P: Q -4 29 such that B(E) = {w : P(w) C E}.
Proof. When the agent allows for impossible possible worlds, there is some tautology that is
not believed at some state. The event in which the tautology is true is Q. If there is a possibility
correspondence mapping Q onto 20 such that B represents P, then for all w', P(w') C Q, and
so the set of states at which the tautology is believed is likewise {w : P(w) C QJ} = Q, a
contradiction of impossible possible worlds. m
There is, however, no problem representing beliefs in the propositional model with a possi-
bility corresondence P mapping Q onto 24, even when the agent considers possible propositions
that are tautologically false. This only becomes impossible when we require the possibility
correspondence to map Q onto 2¢ *, where * = UwCQn , i.e. the set of all propositions which
are objectively true at some state. When this is the case the possibility correspondence cannot
map any state onto a tautologically false proposition, because such a proposition belongs to
no I, - and this contradicts impossible possible worlds by the same reasoning as in the above
proof.
This illustrates a difference between the state space model and the propositional model (with
P : Q --+ 2). In the state space model, the possibility correspondence maps the state space
onto subsets of the objective state space; reality is, as it were, 'hard-wired' into the relation the
model uses to represent beliefs, at least to the extent that its definition rules out impossible
possible worlds right from the start. As we have noted, the propositional model is capable of
doing this as well, if we require P to map the state space onto the set of objectively possible
propositions *; so long as we do not do this, we can use it to represent beliefs that allow
for impossible possible worlds. Of course, it is similarly possible to redefine the possibility
correspondence in the state space model so that its range includes subsets of an extended state
space that includes impossible worlds, and thereby to allow for the representation of beliefs
which allow for impossible possible worlds; Lipman (1999) has done just this. There is, then,
nothing inherent in the state space model which precludes using a possibility correspondence
to represent impossible possible worlds; what prevents this in the standard state space model is
the restriction of the possibility correspondence's range to subsets of the objective state space.
Our reasoning in the section has several times highlighted the fact that when the agent
allows for impossible possible worlds, belief in tautologies (B(Q) = Q in a state space model)
fails. This is not surprising: Morris (1996) finds that, in a standard state space model, a belief
operator is normal if and only if belief in tautologies and distributivity (B(EnF) = B(E)nB(F)
in a state space model, or B(¢ A /\) = B(0) n B(0) in a propositional model) both hold. But
it should be noted that in a propositional model in which the possibility correspondence maps
onto subsets of propositions, without the restriction that these propositions be objectively
possible, belief in tautologies fails even though the possibility correspondence is represented
by B(O) = {w : -, ý P(w)}. In other words, the assertion that belief in tautologies is a
necessary condition for the existence of a possibility correspondence to represent the agent's
beliefs depends on the assumption that the possibility correspondence ranges only over what is
objectively possible. This assumption is implicitly made by the standard state space model.
Once again, the seemingly trivial statement that the agent believes that the true state is one
of the states of the world is not trivial at all if it we are implicitly requiring that the agent can
accurately describe all of those states.
It turns out, however, that we can show that distributivity carries over into the present
model:
Proposition 14 If B represents a possibility correspondence P, then B satisfies
Distributivity: B(¢ A 4) = B(0) n B(0)
Proof. 'We have that B(0) = {w E Q: -0 P(w)}; then
B(O A 0) = {E 'Q -(0 A 0) P(w) }
= {w E Q -fo V •' P(w)}
= {woE Q: -• V E P(w)}C
= {{wE :• E P(w)} U {w E :- EP(W)}}c
= {E -o: E P()} {c n E fw ' E P(w)}c
= {w E Q 0 P(w)} n {wE ' : V P(w)}
= B(0) n B(0)
The first line of the proof follows from the definition of the belief operator. The second follows
from the definition of the connectives. The third follows from the fact that for all 0 E D,
{w E Q : 0 P(w)} = {w E Q : E P(w)}c. The fourth line follows from the assumption that
if 0 V 0 e P(w), then ¢ E P(w) or 0 E P(w). The fifth line follows from DeMorgan's Law.
The sixth follows from the same fact as that which justifies the third. The seventh follows once
again from the definition of the belief operator. m
As noted earlier, however, in the propositional model, if the agent suffers from the impos-
sible possible worlds fallacy, neither belief in tautologies nor a property which we call belief
monotonicity carry over from the standard state space model.
In the current propositional model, B (Q) = Q would be written as
Belief in Tautologies: Q = B(Vwea(A~w))
For a belief operator that represents the possibility correspondence P, this is read, 'the
agent always considers it impossible that at least one proposition from every set %, is false.'
Again this seems natural, so long as we assume that the agent knows how to group propositions
according to states - then surely he must always believe that the true state of the world is
described by some such group, in which none of the propositions making up the group is false.
But it is this assumption that we are relaxing in adopting the propositional model. Whether
because of unawareness, or because the agent takes for granted that some non-trivial proposition
is tautologically true, or for whatever other reason, we allow that the way the agent describes
the full list of possible states may differ from the true objective state space. For this reason,
belief in tautologies is not a trivial property of beliefs in our setting, and we do not automatically
get it from a belief operator that represents a possbility correspondence over propositions.
Secondly, in state space models, a belief operator which is distributive satisfies the following
monotonicity property:
Belief Monotonicity: E C F =* B(E) C B(F).
But in the current setting, we need not have the analogous property: it is not the case
that if ¢ --+ 0 is a tautology22 then B(O) C B(V). If this were the case, then the agent would
be logically omniscient: he would believe all the logical implications of the propositions he
believed true. Belief monotonicity fails because we allow the agent to consider possible states
of the world which can never obtain - rather than ruling out too much, such an agent is failing
to rule out 'impossible worlds'. For example, in our example of starting the car, if it is the
case that turning the key will always start the car, but you allow for this not to be the case, the
you are including in your 'subjective state space' states which never obtain, described both by
'you turn the key' and 'the car does not start.' Even if you believe that you will turn the key,
therefore, you cannot be certain that the car will start, violating belief monotonicity. Lipman
(1999) presents a fuller analysis of this issue in particular.
Note that what is being claimed is not that belief that q -- fails to imply that the agent
will believe O whenever he believes ¢. Indeed, we have already shown in Proposition 1 that so
22This, recall, denotes {w E n: 4 E 4,} CE {w ED : V E %}, which is an empirical statement about the
exogenous state space, in contrast to a 'logical' or 'causal' relationship in any deeper sense.
long as NT holds, beliefs are monotonic in this sense: B( -4 0) n B(O) C B(V). What we
are claiming is that there is no necessary link between the fact that there does not exist, in the
exogenous state space, any state in which both 0 and -i4 are true, and the agent's beliefs about
those or any other propositions. This is one of the main assumptions of this paper: that there
need not be any direct link between 'logical' or 'causal' relationships which do or do not exist
in reality and an agent's understanding of those relationships.
Epistemic negligence, then, and in particular impossible possible worlds, severs this link
between objective facts about the state space and the agent's beliefs. 23 What about the link
between the agent and his own beliefs? What access does the agent have to propositions that
he does or does not believe? In the next section, we turn to this question, and find that
epistemic negligence need not mean, as is usually postulated for unawareness, that the agent
does not know what he does not know.
1.4.4 Nondelusion and Positive and Negative Introspection
Forms of epistemic negligence have often been related in the literature on unawareness to a
failure of negative introspection - that is, a violation of the property that if the agent does not
know something, then he knows that he does not know it. In this section we show that, in the
propositional model of this paper, epistemic negligence need not violate negative introspection.
Instead, it may lead to a violation of nondelusion, or the property that the agent only knows
that which is true.
Recall once more that in state space models the possibility correspondence maps states
onto subsets of the state space, so that P(w) is the set of states considered possible when
the true state is w. In such models we refer to nondelusion, as well as positive and negative
introspection, defined as follows:
Nondelusion: 24  B (E) C E for all events E C .
Positive Introspection: 25 B(E) _ B(B(E)) for all events E C Q.
23 As noted in Barczi (2007), possible impossible worlds (excess certainty) do not sever this link. In this
case beliefs range over a subset of the true state space, because this form of epistemic negligence involves
believing in too many tautologies, and dropping none- meaning that properties such as 0 = B(Vwen(At,)) and
S--+o ==4 ;B(O) C B(O) do hold.
24Morris (1996) refers to this as the 'knowledge axiom'.
25Fagin et al.(1991) and Morris (1996) use this name; Hintikka (1962) calls it 'knowing that one knows'.
Negative Introspection:26  [B(E)]c C B([B(E)] c) for all events E C Q.
It is well known 27 that in a state space model with a possibility correspondence P: --+ 20:
* Beliefs satisfy nondelusion if and only if the possibility correspondence is reflexive: w e
P(w) for all w E Q.
* Beliefs satisfy positive introspection if and only if the possibility correspondence is tran-
sitive: w" e P(w') and w' e P(w) =* w" e P(w) for all w",w',w E Q (equivalently,
w' e P(w) =€ P (w') C P(w) for all w',w e Q).
* Beliefs satisfy negative introspection if and only if the possibility correspondence is euclid-
ean: w" E P(w) and w' e P(w) =- w" E P(w') for all w",w',w E G (equivalently,
w' e P(w) =* P(w) C P(w') for all w',w e Q).
Moreover, Shin (1993) shows that similar results hold in a syntactic model in which knowl-
edge is defined as provability, so that an agent is said to know a proposition 4 at any state such
that € is provable, in standard propositional logic, from the set of propositions 'available' to the
agent at that state. In particular, he defines a relation < on Q such that w 4 w' means that w
is no more informative than w'. He then proves that, as in a state space model, beliefs satisfy
nondelusion if and only if - is reflexive, beliefs satisfy positive introspection if and only if <
is transitive, and that beliefs satisfy both of these, together with negative introspection if and
only if - is euclidean, in addition to being reflexive and transitive.28  Note that in the state
space model, P is both transitive and euclidean if and only if w' e P(w) (or, as we write in the
propositional model, (I, C P(w)) implies that P(w) = P(w'). w' e P(w) then has precisely the
same interpretation as w' - w in Shin (1993): w and w' are just as informative as one another.
26This name is used by Fagin et al. (1991) and Morris (1996). Bacharach (1985) calls this the 'axiom of
wisdom', and Geanakoplos (1995) calls it 'knowing that one does not know'.27 See Morris (1996).
281 In fact, Shin focuses on the property of symmetry (where 4 satisfies symmetry iff w 4 <' W- w' 4< w) rather
than the euclidean property. However, it is well known that a relation is reflexive, transitive, and euclidean
iff it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric iff it is an equivalence relation. This is what Shin proves: that
in the presence of reflexivity and transitivity, the added assumption that < is symmetric implies that it is an
equivalance relation, generating a partition over the state space. The idea of such a partition is familiar from
the standard state-space model of knowledge, where the possibility correspondence generates such a partition
and where nondelusion and positive and negative introspection are all satisfied.
Shin (1993) provides the results necessary for us to say that, in our model, beliefs satisfy
positive and negative introspection, but not nondelusion (as defined in our propositional model).
To see this, note first the following corollary to Propositions 1 and 4:
Corollary 15 w E B(4) iff w E B(LW --+ ) n B(L,).
That is, ¢ is believed at w precisely when it is provable by modus ponens from other
propositions believed at w: L, (a set of propositions which are always believed at w), and
L,- 4• (which, according to Proposition 4, must be believed at all states of the world as
a necessary condition for w E B(4)). We can interpret the model of this paper, then, as a
syntactic model in which knowledge is defined as provability, analogous to Shin's.
Why, then, does Shin's model necessarily satisfy nondelusion and positive introspection, but
not negative introspection, while ours - we claim - satisfies positive and negative instrospection
but not nondelusion? Note that Shin's relation < is defined in a way isomorphic to w < w' 4==>
L, C L,,. It is plain to see that, in our model, the right-hand side of this definition can be
interpreted as 'w is no more informative that w" because no more data are observable by the
agent at w than at w'. 29  Moreover, it is clear that Shin's relation is reflexive and transitive
due to the reflexivity and transitivity of set inclusion. It is not necessarily euclidean, which
is why Shin's model does not necessarily satisfy negative introspection. But it is important
also to realize that in Shin's model, the reflexivity of the relation ordering states (more to
the point, state-dependent information sets) only implies nondelusion when combined with the
environment he assumes for provability. In Shin's model, there is at each state of the world a
subset of those propositions that are true, together with a set of propositions that are always
true (tautologies), available to the agent for the purpose of deriving his beliefs. 'True' is meant
in an objective sense in both cases; the agent makes no mistakes about what he observes or
what he believes to be tautologically true. In this environment, reflexivity of Shin's - implies
nondelusion.
We have not imposed this environment on our agent. Our agent begins able to observe a
set of propositions L. at state w, a subset of that which is true. But in deriving his beliefs,
29 This is also analogous to Lipman's (1999) construction, an integral piece of which is an ordering on the
information sets available to agents at each state of the world.
he may invoke propositions which he takes as tautologically true which are not, or may fail
to invoke a tautologically true proposition in the mistaken belief that it might be false. In
this setting, we cannot infer nondelusion from the reflexivity of set inclusion (i.e., from the fact
that we can order the sets of evident propositions according to L, C L,'). In our setting, we
require something stronger:
Proposition 16 Beliefs satisfy nondelusion if and only if the possibility correspondence repre-
sented by B is reflexive, with 4, C P(w) Vw e Q.
Proof. First we will show that reflexivity implies nondelusion. That is, we want to show
that
(wC 9P(w) = B(0)C{we~2: E 4}
4P,, C P(w) = {E Q : - P(w)} g {w E Q: 0 E (I}
Suppose this is not the case: suppose that D,, C P(w) Vw e l, but that 3w e l, e O :
V P(w) and 0 0~ D. Then by the maximality of ( , € V 4 = w e 4%. But this
contradicts the hypothesis that 4I, C P(w).
Next we show that nondelusion implies reflexivity. Suppose not: suppose that for all € e D,
{w E Ql:-0 P(w)} C {w E Q: 0 E 4D,}, but 3w E ,7 E 4 : 0 E D, and q V P(w). We
have that q V P (w) =* w E B(--i) = - e 4%,. But this implies that q E OD and -0 E (,
which violates the consistency of 4I),. m
In words, the proposition says that the agent believes something which is false if and only
if he considers impossible something which is true. When this is the case, his beliefs can be
described as being too certain about the state of the world, or overconfident, in such a way that
he makes mistakes because he takes for granted that some states of the world cannot obtain.
We have seen above that this occurs precisely when the agent uses a false tautology in his
reasoning process.
The difference between our assumptions and those of Shin, however, does not affect positive
and negative introspection. Our assumption that agents reason from what they observe is
sufficient to deliver a transitive and euclidean possibility correspondence. To see this, note
that P, C P(w') implies that L, C P(w'), which implies, from Proposition 2, that L. = Lw,
and thus that P(w) = P(w'). As we have already noted, 4, Cg P(w') =- P(w) = P(w') if and
only if the possibility correspondence is both transitive and euclidean, and so we see that our
definition of evident propositions30 immediately delivers positive and negative introspection.31
The implication of this discussion is that unawareness need not be linked to a failure of
negative introspection, as it is typically characterized in the literature. We see here one of the
limits of our standard models of knowledge. It is tempting to say that unawareness must be
identified with a lack of any positive or negative knowledge of an event (and hence a failure of
negative introspection). But a state space model does not handle well agents who fail to ask
questions, take for granted (consciously or not) that certain propositions are true, and group
propositions into states in ways that leave out states that can obtain or generate states that
never exist. When we allow for agents such as these, we call into question our assertion of
reflexivity/nondelusion, which is probably the most widely accepted of the three properties
discussed in this section. Moreover, we see that agents may be unaware without violating
negative introspection, when their unawareness is expressed by way of the possible impossible
worlds fallacy (excess certainty).
To see why this might be the case, return to our example of starting the car. You may
assume that turning the key will start your car because you are unaware of the car battery;
you have not even considered the question of whether it is dead. Earlier we assumed away
the possibility that you consider neither a dead battery nor a good battery possible (which,
in our model, would be tantamount to believing both). Clearly, your expectation that your
car will start reveals that you do not believe that the battery is dead; now we are asking if we
should say that you do not believe that you do not believe that the battery is dead, as we are
accustomed to saying in characterizing unawareness. But note that we have no difficulty at
all in saying that you believe that if you turn the key, the car will start, a proposition which
is true whenever the battery is not dead (and which is only trivially true when the battery is
dead - i.e., when you do not turn the key at all). There is a sense, then, in which we are able
to express your 'belief' that the proposition 'the battery is good' is tautologically true. Once
3oIt is also to be noted that we assume NT throughout, which rules out trivial belief in both a proposition of
which one is unaware and its negation.
31Proposition 3 also characterizes the transitivity of our possibility correspondence, at the level of individual
elements 4 E t, rather than sets 1, C ).
we have done this, it is no great leap to say that you believe that you believe the battery is
good, or that you believe that you do not consider a dead battery possible. Were we working
in a state space model, this issue would not arise at all, because in a state space model an event
is a set of states, independent of the content of the propositions describing it (this property is
at the heart of belief monotonicity, discussed above; it is for this reason that the property is
occasionally called 'event sufficiency'). It is only when we work in a propositional model and
explicitly decouple states from the propositions that describe them that Bruce's unawareness
tempts us to say that he must violate negative introspection.
This discussion complements that of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a), which shows
how standard state space models preclude unawareness. See Barczi (2007) for more discussion
of beliefs regarding propositions of which one is unaware.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has sought to unify two phenomena associated with unawareness under the single
framework of epistemic negligence. Changes in awareness information, intuitively, can either
lead an agent to realize that the world is much less, or much more, certain, than he had previ-
ously realized. This paper has argued that both changes are related to the agent's epistemic
relation to tautologies. Awareness information that makes one more certain comes when one
realizes that an implication which one had held to be uncertain is, in fact, tautologically true.
Conversely, greater uncertainty results from new awareness of a question which one had not pre-
viously asked, assuming (consciously or not) that its answer lay tautologically in one direction.
Both of these errors can be depicted in terms of 'default beliefs' - in allowing for impossible
possible worlds, one believes, by default, that some implication does not hold tautologically,
while possible impossible worlds imply a default belief that some implication is always true.
Nevertheless, because there is no proposition in the sentential logic employed in this paper to
express the non-tautological nature of a given proposition (that q is not a tautology does not
mean that --¢ is, etc.), the two errors are independent from one another.
In exploring these different types of epistemic negligence, we have learned several interesting
things about state space models, propositional models, and modeling unawareness. First, we
have seen that standard state-space models, by assuming that agents always know that the
true state of the world is one of the true states of the world, and that they can list all of
these accurately, rule out epistemic negligence a priori. Second, we have shown that in a
standard state space model, there is no way to represent beliefs in impossible possible worlds
with a normal belief operator. This, however, was shown not to be a property of state space
models as opposed to propositional models, but of models in which beliefs can range only
over what can be objectively true as opposed to models in which beliefs are allowed to range
over impossible possible worlds as well. Finally, we argued that unawareness, as modeled by
epistemic negligence, need not violate negative introspection. Working in a propositional model
helps to make clear why this is, by dropping the assumption that all we need to describe is the
states, rather than the propositions, which are the objects of belief.
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Chapter 2
The Logic of Socratic Wisdom: A
Propositional Model Approach to
Learning What You Don't Know
2.1 Introduction
In the standard state space model of knowledge, the ignorance of an economic agent is never
greater than when that agent can provide a complete description of every possible way the world
could turn out to be, but cannot narrow this list down to a proper subset of the state space that
he knows to include the true state of the world. He is better off if he can learn, of course, and
this learning always takes the form of ruling states out. Morris (1996) has shown that, given a
fixed state of the world over time, and an agent who benefits from his learning about this state,
the agent can never rule in a state of the world once he has ruled it out; neither can he ever rule
out the true state. This paper argues that these are characteristics not of learning, but of the
state-space model which is typically employed by economists to study learning. We develop
a decision theory-based model in which welfare-enhancing learning is compatible with both
ruling in what has previously been ruled out, and false beliefs (or delusion). The key feature
of the model is that the agent's knowledge ranges not over objective states, which consist of
lists of propositions which are true or false, but over the propositions themselves. This allows
us to relax a key assumption of a state space model - namely, that whatever the agent may not
know, he does know how properly to group propositions into complete and logically consistent
descriptions of ways the world could be (that is to say, states). When an agent lacks this
capability, we say he is epistemically negligent.
This paper focuses on a variety of epistemic negligence which has only received indirect
attention in the economics literature on unawareness. It is generally assumed that agents
know all the propositions of which states are constructed - i.e., they know all the questions
there are to be asked, even if they know the resolution of none. This paper allows for the
possibility that, in fact, not all propositions - not even all propositions relevant to a given
decision problem - are known to an agent. It focuses attention on the case where, if a question
is not asked, the agent behaves by default as if it were always resolved in one particular direction.
In effect, he restricts his attention to a subset of the state space, simply by failing to ask if
some state outside of the state space might be the true state. This paper argues that realizing
that one is making such an error and ruling in contingencies that one has previously ruled out
is a welfare-enhancing part of learning.
The model of the paper is similar to standard models of knowledge used in game theory, but
with propositions rather than states as the objects of belief. It is assumed that the researcher
can observe the agent's preferences across acts, from which can be inferred his subjective beliefs
regarding which propositions are possible and which are true. We discuss what should be
assumed regarding propositions of which the agent is unaware - i.e., questions he does not ask.
Because the model identifies considering a proposition impossible with belief in its negation, it
implies that if an agent considers neither a proposition of which he is unware possible, nor its
negation (which seems natural), then he believes both! It is shown, however, that this paradox
is not compatible with reasoning in which belief that 0 is true, and that -+ + 0 is true as well,
implies belief that 4 is true. We take this form of reasoning to be fundamental; as a result, we
assume throughout the paper that when an agent is unaware of a proposition, he behaves as if
he believed it either to be tautologically true or false, 'taking for granted' the resolution of the
question he has failed to ask.
This is one major assumption of the paper; the second is the notion of 'evident propositions'.
These are, simply, those which can be 'seen'; they are the data available to the agent, from which
he infers his beliefs about what other propositions are possible and/or true. The assumption
implicit in this approach is that if two states of the world look the same to an agent, then his
preferences and beliefs must be the same in each. We employ this approach to arrive at the
main result of the paper. We first define delusion (false belief) and refinement (in which agents
only rule contingencies out), and a formal notion of learning which makes an agent better off
over time. We then show that this sort of learning is consistent with delusion, but only a
proscribed form of delusion in which, at a given point in time, a false belief that is held in one
state of the world is held also in any state which 'looks the same'. It is also consistent with
the failure of refinement, but only when contingencies that are ruled in should not have been
ruled out in the first place, but were falsely believed impossible because the agent had failed to
ask a question and was taking its resolution for granted.
The literature on unawareness, which considers issues very near to those in this paper, has
been growing recently. Kreps (1979, 1992) first provided a decision theoretic model of un-
foreseen contingencies, and Geanakoplos (1989) was one of the first to consider relaxing the
assumptions of the state space model which, as Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) have
shown, preclude unawareness. Outside the field of economics, researchers in artificial intelli-
gence (Fagin and Halpern (1988), Halpern (2001), Lam (2001)) and epistemology (Gardenfors
(1988), Horty (2005)) have explicitly considered not only unawareness but how the set of ques-
tions asked by an agent may evolve. More recently models of knowledge which allow for
unawareness and the asking of new questions have been explored by Modica and Rustichini
(1994, 1999), Feinberg (2004a, 2004b, 2004c), Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2004), and Li
(2003). These have focused explicitly on modeling static knowledge in which unawareness is
possible, but have not explored a process by which awareness information may endogenously be
gained. Neither have they considered, in a decision theoretic sense, the sort of behavior which
would characterize an agent who must learn the questions he needs to ask, as Morris (1996) has
done for the standard, rational agent. It is this last gap which the current paper seeks to fill.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an example to help make the
ideas treated in this paper more concrete. Section 3 presents the model, building from observed
preferences to the subjective beliefs which can be inferred from them. The propositional model
employed in this paper is compared to the standard state space model used in most of the
game theoretic literature on knowledge and learning. In Section 4, we introduce the concept
of evident propositions and the assumption that if two states 'look' the same, then preferences
and beliefs must be the same in each. Several results of this assumption are presented. Section
5 describes formally delusion, refinement, and the notion of learning which enhances welfare
over time. The main result of the paper, that welfare-enhancing learning is compatible with
delusion and the failure of refinement, is presented and discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 An Example
This paper is grounded in the view that awareness derives from a process undertaken before and
during a decision problem: when presented with a decision problem, an individual must think
of what dimensions of uncertainty will be relevant to the problem - a list of true/false questions
which we will call the proposition space. As she does so, she constructs a state space, where
each state is described by a unique permutation of truth values for each of the questions she
believes relevant. Any mental costs involved in this construction will deter a decision maker
from bringing to bear irrelevant questions. But these costs may also prevent the decision
maker from continuing to ask questions until all relevant dimensions of uncertainty have been
enumerated. It must be noted that a decision problem can take many different forms. In a
laboratory, a subject may be told all the possible states of the world (a red ball is drawn from
an urn, a blue ball is drawn from an urn, etc...) and their probabilities, or he may be asked to
choose among lotteries, from which choices his subjective probabilistic beliefs can be inferred.
But in the real world, decision problems are rarely so transparent. A decision problem may
be {Go on a picnic, Stay home}, and the agent is left to herself to construct the proposition
space, the corresponding state space (which depends not only on the propositions but on her
beliefs about the logical relationships among them, which are presumably derived from past
experience), the consequences of taking each act at each state, and, in the end, the optimal act
or acts, depending on all of these plus her beliefs about what propositions are actually true.
A simple example may help to make concepts more concrete. Suppose Bruce is planning
a picnic on Boston Common, and looks out his window at the weather beacon atop the Old
Hancock Tower to see if rain is expected. For simplicity, suppose that the beacon has only two
settings: if a storm is expected, a red light is lit, and otherwise, for dry weather, there is no
light. Bruce, seeing no light atop the beacon, goes out to have his picnic, and ends up getting
rained on. What has gone wrong?
One possible explanation is that Bruce forgot to take into account that the beacon uses an
electric light, and that on this particular day the power had malfunctioned in some way such
that the beacon could not be turned on. Then the proposition 'the power is out', or the event
consisting of the set of states in which there is no power, is in this example one of which the
now-drenched Bruce was, and perhaps still is, unaware. Although he took for granted that
seeing no beacon implied that there would be no rain, he could not previously have told you
that he knew there was power. Nor could he have told you that he knew that he did not
know that there was power. Any statement involving the power source at all would have been
inexpressible for Bruce. 1
Attempting to model this more formally runs into difficulty immediately. Suppose we rep-
resent the proposition 'it is raining' by r, 'the beacon is lit' by b, and 'the beacon's power source
is functioning' by p. -r, -b, and -p, respectively, will represent the negations of these propo-
sitions. We can think of the true state space as being either the full product space {r, --r} x
{b, -b} x {p, -p}, or as the 'consistent' 2 subset of this space {(r, b,p), (r, -ib, -p), (--r, -b,p), (-r, -b, -p)};
this is itself a nontrivial modeling decision. Should inconsistent states be left out of the state
space entirely, or included and assigned zero probability, or indeed e-probability (which has
been proposed by some Bayesians as a way of handling zero-probability events)? Similarly, it
seems natural that Bruce's subjective state space would correspond either to the product space
{r, -r} x {b, -b} or to the two states he considers possible, {(r, b), (-nr,-1b)}. But then what
exactly is Bruce unaware of? We would like to say that he does not know the event p (i.e.,
the set of states in which p is true). But what is this event? Is it the entire state space, since
Bruce's subjective state space corresponds exactly to that part of the full state space in which
p is true? On this interpretation, we would say that Bruce does know p, no matter what the
true state.
' This is a strong statement, and is likely not a necessary part of modeling unawareness. What is important
is not that some proposition has never occurred to an agent or that he cannot describe it at all, but that he does
not do so in formulating a particular decision problem.
2 The term is used informally here; we will discuss logical relations between propositions in more detail below.
On the other hand, we could say that in Bruce's subjective state space the event p is the
empty set, since p does not appear, and any standard state space model will tell us that Bruce
always knows that he does not know that the true state is in the empty set, which seems to
say that he is not unaware of p. More to the point, how could Bruce know any event involving
the proposition p, if p appears nowhere in his subjective state space? If every true state is a
triple involving a proposition which appears nowhere in Bruce's subjective information, then
how can Bruce know any state, or any event, at all? It seems that even if Bruce were to assert
nothing, stating only that the true state is one of the possible states, he would be incorrect,
for if you pushed him to list all of those states, they would not be complete descriptions of the
ways the world could be.3 Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) assume this possibility away,
which is crucial to their argument that standard models preclude unawareness; papers like Li
(2003) and Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2004) model unawareness by explicitly differentiating
between awareness information (the set of propositions from which the subjective state space
is constructed) and the usual concept of knowledge. The seemingly incoherent idea that an
agent who is unaware of a proposition both knows and does not know that proposition will be
further explored in the next section of this paper.
The point is simply that the standard model does not have a way to allow that Bruce is
capable of knowledge of events involving rain or the beacon, and, at the same time, that events
involving the power source simply do not appear in his subjective state space. Note, however,
that the example given above is consistent with a story in which Bruce was perfectly aware
of the power source, but simply took for granted that it was functioning properly; nothing
in the model presented below distinguishes between these two errors. Both are cases of an
epistemically negligent agent failing to consider all relevant questions; allowing that he may do
so suffices to relax the state-space model assumptions of logical omniscience. We then seek
necessary conditions on beliefs which must obtain for an agent who is boundedly rational in
this sense, but who nevertheless benefits from learning over time.
3I do not wish to push this point too far; if we require that subjective states be complete lists of truth-values
for all possible dimensions of uncertainty, then it is hard to imagine that anyone could ever know anything. The
point is once again that if the state space itself is subjectively constructed for a particular decision problem, then
it seems interesting to ask what learning looks like if we allow the construction to leave out decision-relevant
propositions.
2.3 Notation and the Model
2.3.1 Primitives
The primitives of the model are a set of propositions and a set of states, together with a
correspondence between them. Propositions, defined formally below, are statements that
describe some aspect of the world and of which the agent may have awareness and/or knowledge.
In a typical state space model, the agent's uncertainty and hence beliefs are about what states
of the world are possible and/or true; propositions are only indirectly referenced, as in the
definition of a state as a 'complete and logically consistent description of a way the world might
be.' The approach adopted here is to take the agent's beliefs about propositions, rather than
states, as primitive, with minimal assumptions about how these beliefs map to the objective
state space.
Propositions
Assume a finite set of letters A, with typical elements a, r, etc., and the symbols A, -, (, and
). These symbols are taken as exogenously given and fixed throughout.
Let S denote the set of strings generated from A by finite application of the following three
rules in any sequence:
1. Every letter belonging to A is a string.
2. If a and r are strings, then so is (a) A (r).
3. If a is a proposition, then so is -,(a).
In what follows, we omit the parentheses when there is no risk of confusion. We also use
aVr- as an abbreviation for -n(--a A-i-r), 0 -4 r as an abbreviation for - (aA-i7) (or, equivalently,
-a V T), and a +- r as an abbreviation for (a - r) A (5 -r).
We use these strings to model statements describing aspects of the world. It is not appealing,
however, merely to identify the set of propositions ( with the set of strings S (or to cut out
4Thus, the set of propositions is closed under disjunction and implication, as well as conjunction, the latter
having been given as Rule 2.
the definition of strings and simply define propositions as we define strings above). If we were
to do so, a question would arise at this point about propositions which are syntactially distinct
strings, but which seem to express the same content. 5 For example, if p denotes rain, it seem
clear that -- 'p and p A p should denote rain as well. Similarly, we would like to model ¢ A V
and 0 A 4 as being the same proposition, despite being distinct strings. This latter point will
be particularly important when, in the next section (and throughout the paper), we want to
express the statement that all propositions in a set of propositions E C D are true using the
single proposition AE. If ¢ A 4 and 4 A € are different propositions - i.e., if the proposition
depends on the order in which the conjunction operator A is applied - then it is not clear that
AE is well-defined. In addition, even starting from a finite set of letters A, S is clearly infinite;
we have only allowed for finite conjunction, and so if E C 4 is not finite then, once again, AE
is not well-defined.
A common approach to this issue is to identify propositions with their logical content, and
equate logically equivalent propositions to one another. Indeed, this is the approach taken in
a state-space model: whether propositions are only indirectly referenced or explictly 'in the
model' (as in Samet (1990) and Shin (1993)), a set of states can be identifed by any proposition
describing it. If multiple propositions describe the same set of states, then these are regarded
as being equivalent.
If we identify a proposition by its logical content (using standard first-order propositional
logic), then we immediately have that p = -,-p = p A p for all p and that 0 A V = 0 A 0 for all
0, . However, we also have that V -i4 = V for all 0, 4: all tautologies are equivalent
because they all hold the same logical content (essentially, they are empty of content, since
they hold at all states of the world). If we take this approach, therefore, then any agent that
recognizes one tautology as a tautology must recognize all tautologies as such. But it is just
this assumption which we seek to relax.
For this reason, we take a middle course. We identify a proposition as a set of strings which
are logically equivalent and which consist of the same set of letters from A (plus A and -).
More formally:
5I am very grateful to Haluk Ergin for pointing this out to me and suggesting the discussion in the rest of
this section.
Define the equivalence6 relation - across strings to mean that for any s, s' E S, s - s' if
s and s' are logically equivalent according to standard first-order propositional logic. For any
string s, let M, C A denote the set of letters from which s is constructed (together with the
symbols A and -1). And for any string s, let [s] = {s' E S: s' - s and M, = M,}, or 'the
equivalence class of s'.7
Now, we define the set of propositions 4 as the quotient set S/ - of equivalence classes:
4 = {[s]: s S}.
Note the following about this definition:
* It reflects the assumption that the letters bear meaning, and allows for agents who may
believe that some proposition is true, and yet fail to believe another proposition with the
same logical content, but expressed in a different way.
* It does not completely relax the assumption that agents recognize logical equivalence
across propositions: so long as two logically equivalent strings are constructed from the
same set of letters from A, they are modeled as the same proposition and will be treated
as such by the agent in this paper. Of course, the current approach is motivated by
the fact that we don't want to completely drop the assumption that logical equivalence is
recognized. For example:
* Under this approach, the strings q, --i-i and OAO are all modeled as the same proposition,
and are therefore recognized as equivalent by the agent. However, the agent need not
recognize that 
€ V -€ and 0 V -1V are equivalent ways of describing the full state space.
Neither need he recognize the equivalance of any proposition 0 and q A (4 V -'0), as 4
may be something of which he is unaware.
It is immediate from the construction that for all ¢, V e 4(, s, s' E 0, t, t' e 4, one has
s A t , s' A t' ), -s -is', and Ms U Mt = Mi, U Met. Hence, the operations of conjuction and
negation (and therefore disjunction and material implication as well) can naturally be extended
6 I.e., it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
7Note that were we to replace 'MW, = M.' with 'M., C M.' (i.e., such that strings constructed from a subset
of the letters in s belong to [s]), these would not be equivalence classes because the relation identifying pairs
that belong to the same class would not be transitive.
from strings to propositions. In the sequel, we abuse language and refer to a proposition as
a description of some aspect of the way the world may be, when in fact it consists of a set of
such descriptions, all logically equivalent to one another. Moreover, we denote by MO the set
of letters from A from which all strings in the equivalence class 0 are constructed.
Finally, note that in this model the set of propositions is finite.8
States
Each proposition is interpreted as describing some aspect of the way the world may be. There
is also a set of states of the world, R, with typical element w e Q. As usual, this is defined
as the set of complete and logically consistent descriptions of ways the world might be. As
such, we identify each state as a unique set of propositions 4, Cg b, which is simply the set of
propositions which are true at state w. 9  By definition, 4% = (D, i w = w'. We assume the
following about each 4%:
1. For every 0 E 4 and for every we Q, exactly one of the pair q, -i belongs to (D. We
call the assumption that at least one of the pair belongs to 4, maximality; we call the
assumption that only one of this pair belongs to 4% consistency.
2. For every w e Q, q and V both belong to 4, if and only if 4 A V belongs to 4).
Recalling how the connective V is defined from A and -, these two assumptions imply that
for every w E Q, if 0 e D,, then, for any other 4 e (, € V V belongs to D,. Conversely, for
every w E Q, if q V V e 4D, then q or 4 must belong to 4% (where 'or' is not exclusive).
8 This is easier to see in the following equivalent way of modeling propositions, which is more concise but less
transparent than that presented in the text.
Define the set of propositions 4 as the set of pairs 0 = {(M, f)}, where M C A is a nonempty subset of letters
in A denoting the domain of ¢ and f : {0, 1}M --* {O, 1} is a function mapping vectors of truth values for the
letters in M onto truth values for the proposition.
Further, define the operators - and A on the set of propositions:
If 0 = (M, f) and % = (M', g), then -0 = (M, 1 - f) and A i = (MU M', f * g).
The operators V and --* are defined as abbreviations as previously.
The identification of each proposition with a set of truth values for a subset of A is equivalent to the definition
given in the text, which identifies each proposition with the set of logically equivalent strings constructed of the
same subset of A. Moreover, as there are a finite number of subsets of A, and therefore a finite number of
distinct functions mapping these subsets onto truth values, it is clear that the set of propositions is a finite set.
'The first to have defined states from propositions in this way appears to have been Samet (1990).
Each state can then be fully described as the state where the propositions in %, are true
and those in 4\o, are false.
We associate the state space Q with the set {1D}we. For each w E , we denote by the
proposition A, the conjunction of all propositions associated with state w.10
2.3.2 The Decision Problem
The data observed by the assumed researcher of this paper are preferences, or decisions from
which preferences can be inferred. Subjective beliefs are known only by inference from these
preferences.
Formally, the agent is faced with a finite decision problem T, a set of acts. Each f E F
maps states of the world onto consequences: f : --+ X C R. We can also write f = {fw}E,
where f, E X is the payoff associated with act f at state w. As in Morris, write c for an act
which gives c E R in every state of the world.
The agent's preferences are over the acts in his decision problem F. I adopt Morris'
approach of allowing the preference relation to vary with the state, and as in his paper I
emphasize that this need not have anything to do with how the utility from a given act actually
varies with the state. f >, g means only that act f is weakly preferred to act g, conditional
on the true state being w; the agent's preferences are characterized by the set of preference
relations {>w}wen. We will also write f >w,t g to mean that act f is preferred to act g when
the state is w and the time is t; time can be thought of as one of the propositions, but one which
is never payoff relevant and has no effect on the other propositions characterizing a given state.
That is, it is as if there exists for every time period an identical copy of the same finite objective
state space, but with the time appended to each 4,; the same set of acts mapping states onto
consequences is operative in all time periods. In other words, when time comes into play (which
will not be until the main result at the end of the paper), we will be considering an agent who
is evaluating the same decision problem at different points in time, with evolving preferences -
not one who considers a series of decision problems over time, with the same preferences.
We have emphasized that the agent does not necessarily perceive states as they are - i.e.,
"
0 Note that A4, returns the same proposition regardless of the order in which conjunction is carried out across
the propositions in 4ý.
that he may be epistemically negligent, not knowing how to group propositions into complete
and consistent descriptions of the true elements of the state space. This has two implications
here. First, it is important not to interpret a statement of preference f >, g as meaning that
the agent understands the act's domain, accurately perceiving the underlying states which are
mapped by the act to consequences and calculating the expected outcome of each act using
a weighted sum of its possible consequences with the relative subjective probabilities of these
states as weights. To be explicit: he may be overconfident and leave states out of consideration
(the focus of this paper), or he may include states which cannot obtain (the focus of Lipman
(1999)). When we refer to epistemic negligence, we simply denote one or both of these mistakes.
Second, it is important also to be clear about what is meant by the notation (f4, g-,), which
we will use frequently. This will denote the concatenation of taking act f when ¢ is true, and
act g when ¢ is false, as perceived by the agent. The point is that just as the agent may not
accurately describe the domain of the act f, he also may not accurately describe the restriction
of the domain of f to states where ¢ is true. His perception of this restricted domain may,
once again, leave states out or include states which never obtain.
Write f Ž g if f, ý gVw E Q; f > g if f S g and f, > g, for some we f; and f > g if
fw > gwVw E Q.
2.3.3 Linking Beliefs and Preferences
The beliefs of the agent are known by the researcher only by inference from her preferences, as
we will describe in this section. In considering the beliefs of the agent, I retain the notion of
a possibility correspondence, but alter its definition from the standard one. In particular, my
possibility correspondence P is a mapping from states of the world to propositions considered
possible at that state: P : Q -+ 2"'. Then we write ¢ e P(w) to mean that ¢ is considered
possible when the true state is w. Note that P(w) depends only on w, the state of the world,
so that a change in what is considered possible entails a change in the state.
We follow Morris in explicitly linking preferences and beliefs. He, of course, is not the first
to do so; Ramsey argued that beliefs should be inferred from preferences in nearly the same
way (Ramsey (1926)), as did Savage (1954). The possibility correspondence is defined from
preferences as follows:
Definition 17 P(w) = {q : (fo, h,-) >-, (go, h-,O) for some f, g, h E F}
In other words, the set of propositions considered possible at state w is the set of non-null
propositions. We assume that P (w) 5 0 for all w e E0; the agent always considers something
possible. Moreover, we assume that:
* if 0 V ¢ E P(w), then 0 E P(w) or 0 E P(w)
* if ¢ E P(w), then ¢ V V E P(w), for all V E D such that M, = M4
* if 0 A^ e P(w), then q E P(w) and 4 e P(w)
Note that the conjunction q A V need not be considered possible whenever q and ' are
individually considered possible.
What is the analog in our model to the statement that some state w' was considered possible?
This would be the case at state w when for every 0 E (,, 0 E P(w), that is, when 4 j, C P(w).
In other words, when every proposition true at state w' is considered possible, we would say
that the state itself is considered possible. This, however, should be taken as representing a
statement by the modeler, and not necessarily the agent, because we are not assuming that the
agent knows that state w' is described by the set of propositions 4%, or even that she conceives
of state w' at all.
Just as propositions are considered possible when they are not null, we will define beliefs in
terms of propositions which are null:
Definition 18 Belief operator B reflects preference relations {W}we if
{B(q) = w E : (f4, g-,) ,, (f4, h-,O) for all f, g,h e F}
Thus, when 0 is believed, preferences are unaffected by what happens when q is false: --0
is then a null proposition.
The following proposition linking the belief operator and the possibilty correspondence will
be very convenient:
Proposition 19 B(4) = {w E Q: -04 V P(w)}.
Proof. The statement follows trivially from the definitions of the possibility correspondence
and the belief operator. *
In other words, B represents P just in case the set of states at which a proposition is
believed is the same as the set of states at which the proposition's negation is not consid-
ered possible. This proposition, we will say, states that the belief operator B represents the
possibility correspondence P.
At this point we must make a brief digression. The relation of this paper to the literature
on unawareness has been noted, and the attentive reader may ask what our model implies about
an agent who is unaware of some proposition ¢. It seems natural to say that for this agent,
both € and -i€ are null - but doesn't this directly imply that he believes both ¢ and -no?
It seems that two answers to this question are possible. One is to note that, as in our initial
example, behavior does not always allow us to distinguish between unawareness of 4 and belief
that either € or -'4 is considered possible. Recall that Bruce, unaware of the power source,
went on his picnic whenever he saw no beacon - but this is exactly how Bruce would behave if
he were not only aware of the power source, but believed that it was functioning properly. The
behavioral phenomena which we associate with unawareness often have this sort of 'taking-for-
granted' flavor, because an agent who is unaware of a proposition does not lack the answer to
a question; he is failing to ask the question at all. In every decision problem, the agent must
first consider which dimensions of uncertainty are relevant, and then what he believes about the
resolutions of these dimensions; behavior is likely to conform to default 'beliefs' for dimensions
which are not considered, just as it would for dimensions which are considered and assigned
beliefs degenerate on one particular resolution (see Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (1998b) and
Horty (2005)).
Nevertheless, could behavior ever be such that we would, in fact, say that an agent believes
both q and -- ? This would imply that both --i and 0 are null to the agent; she could display
no strict preference between any pair of acts which differed only when 4 were true, or only
when it were false. Note the similarity between this statement and the usual conception of
unawareness: an agent is usually said to be unaware of a proposition (an event, in most of the
literature) when he does not know the proposition, and does not know that he does not know
it... and so on (some authors have defined unawareness as consisting only of at least the first
two levels of this hierarchy; see Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998a) for an example in which
this two-level definition does not imply the infinite hierarchy). In other words, the agent who
is unaware of q has no positive knowledge of 0 - or, naturally, of --¢. If so, then we may expect
that he can not strictly rank acts which differ only when 0 is true, or only when q is false.
Our two answers to this question seem to be in conflict with one another. One view of
unawareness - the 'taking for granted' view - posits that though an agent may be unaware of
a proposition, he nevertheless acts as though it is not null, or even as if he believes it is true
(and its negation false). The other view holds that he will, on the contrary, act as if it were
both true and false, in the sense that he treats both it and its negation as null. It is my belief
that there is in fact no conflict, but that the two concepts are simply referring to two separate
things. Here our focus is on the former sort of situation.
In fact, there is a very good reason to direct our focus on this way, and to rule out the
possibility that an agent can treat both a proposition and its negation as null, as we now
show. This paper is very much concerned with the way that agents form their beliefs using
(perceived) implications. As will become clearer below, the basic assumption made here is
that agents reason in the way alluded to by Frank Ramsey in 1930. That is, if they believe
0 --+ 0, and then come to believe that 0, they will conclude that '.11." This seems like a natural
assumption to make, and it is certainly the situation which the present paper has in mind.
It turns out, however, that if we restrict ourselves to agents who do reason in this way, we
implicitly rule out the trivial sort of belief in 0 that obtains when neither 0 nor its negation is
considered possible.
To be more formal, let us make the following assumption about P, which we will call non-
triviality (NT):
(NT) For all 0,o E (D, B(0) {w f : E E P(w)} C {W E D: A E P(W)}. 12
In words, NT says that if q is believed, and any other proposition is considered possible,
then the conjunction of that proposition with 0 must also be considered possible. For example,
"1 And conversely, if they do not believe € --+ V, then they need not conclude that 4 if they believe that 4; see
the discussion of belief monotonicity below.
12Note that NT represents a further assumption on P: it may be written as 'For all 0, 0 E 4, {w E -: 4
P(w)} fl {w E : V E P(w)} C {w E 0 : 4 A P(w)}.'
if I believe that today is Thursday, and also consider it possible that the date is March 1, then
I must consider it possible that today is Thursday, March 1. We will assume that NT holds in
the rest of the paper. Note that the right-hand side is a subset of {w E : E P(w)}, and so
one implication of this assumption is that if ¢ is believed, then it is considered possible, and not
only trivially 'believed'. We have assumed that P(w) is never empty, and so this assumption
implies that belief will only be of the non-trivial sort; moreover, when the only member of
P(w) is 4, w E B(4) together with NT implies nothing beyond this non-triviality. The added
content of this assumption obtains when some other proposition 0 is considered possible at
w e B(O), in which case the assumption says that the conjunction A V is considered possible
as well. This is intuitive: if € is believed, then any other proposition which is considered
possible must be believed to be compatible with q - if q A O were not considered possible, then
the belief that ¢ should preclude the possibility that 0.
With this in mind, the following proposition, which says that agents reason in the Ramsey
manner described above if and only if NT holds (and which is proved in Barczi (2007)), is quite
natural:
Proposition 20 NT holds for all w E Q if and only if B(O -+0) n B(O) _ B(V) for all 4, 0.
Note again the implication of this proposition: if we assume that agents reason in such
a way that whenever they believe q -- 0, and they believe 4, they also believe 0, then we
implicitly assume that beliefs are held non-trivially, since an implication of NT is that B(4) C
{w E : 4 e P(w)}. The only way this can fail to hold is if we drop our assumption that
P(w) is non-empty for all w;13 if we drop this assumption, however, we allow for states at which
nothing is considered possible and everything is believed. The reason that we assume NT and
not the weaker B(O) C {w E Q : 4 e P(w)} is that we will be assuming Ramsey reasoning
at various points in the paper, and so we may as well make clear the added content of our
assumptions captured by NT.
That digression past, let us make one final remark about the way we have defined beliefs:
note that it explicitly states that beliefs are concerned with what can be ruled out. The standard
13Note that, so long as P (w) 5 0 for all w E Q, some proposition is considered possible at every state at which
4 is believed, for any 0 E (. If this proposition is 4 for a particular w' E B(O), then q A V E P(w'), and thus
SE P(w'). The same argument holds for all w E B(O).
formulation implicitly does the same thing (if every state considered possible lies within the
event E, we can rule out every state outside E), and our definition shares many properties of
the usual one. We now present some results concerning such properties, and concerning the
other main assumption (in addition to NT) made in the paper.
2.4 Preliminary Results
2.4.1 Evident Propositions
Other than NT, the main assumption of the model is that the primary way the agent forms
his beliefs and preferences is on the basis of what he can observe - and that he does so in a
'consistent' way. First, then, we must define what is meant by 'what the agent can observe.'
Definition 21 The set of evident propositions L C P is defined as the set of propositions
satisfying the following two properties:
1. If l E L, -l E L.
2. Ifl E L 4, then w E B(1).
For simplicity we write L, - L n 4%.
The interpretation is that these are the facts about the state of the world which can be
'seen'; they are the data upon which the agent bases his view of the world, so that the truth
value of any other proposition and all preferences must be inferred from these. We assume
that the set of evident propositions is nonempty, and that it is constant for a given agent, with
no dependence on the state of the world. In particular, we will assume, when we consider how
beliefs change over time, that the set of evident propositions does not change over time: what
is 'seen' today is believed whenever it is true in the future as well. Note that the fact that L is
nonempty together with the first part of its definition imply that L" is nonempty for all w e E02;
the agent can always 'see' something.
The major assumption which our approach makes is the following:
Assumption: for all w, w' E , Lw = L', -,
In words, our assumption says that two states look the same to the agent if and only if
he has the same preferences in those two states. The assumption imposes consistency on the
beliefs of the agent across states which are indistinguishable to him.
Similar to the proposition AD,, we will denote the proposition AL, the conjunction of all
evident propositions true at state w.14 Moreover, for simplicity I will often write the conjunction
of 0 and every proposition in the set L, as q A L, where there is no risk of confusion as to this
term's meaning.
Of course, given the construction of beliefs from preferences, our assumption implies L, =
LW, # P(w) = P(w'). In words, two states look the same to the agent if and only if the agent
has the same preferences in those two states, which in turn implies that he has the same beliefs
in those two states.
I now summarize some basic results from Barczi (2007) which describe the model and will
prove useful in the sequel. First, we show that an agent, at some state w, considers possible
the evident propositions which characterize his view of some other state w' if and only if his
view of that state and of the true state are identical.
Proposition 22 L, C P(w') a L, = L,,
We can extend this idea to non-evident propositions as well. The following result, which
follows immediately from the previous one, simply re-expresses our assumption that when two
states look the same to the agent, any proposition considered possible at one is considered
possible at another.
Proposition 23 Vw, w' E Q, ¢ A L, E P(w') E P(w).
It follows from this result that if a proposition is considered impossible at some state, then
the observable data at that state are always believed incompatible with the proposition.
Proposition 24 q 0 P(w) ý Q C B(L, --+ -)
This can be interpreted as formalizing what we have said about 'taking for granted'. Re-
turning to our original example, the proposition says that because Bruce saw no beacon and
14As with AN , AL, returns the same proposition regardless of the order in which conjunction is applied to
the propositions in L,.
considered rain impossible, he always considers rain impossible when he sees no beacon. Im-
plicitly, he is assuming that seeing no beacon provides him with all the information he needs to
infer that no rain is coming. In other words, he takes for granted that there is nothing - like a
malfunctioning power source - that would necessitate that he be less than certain of favorable
picnic weather when the beacon is not lit.
2.4.2 Distributivity
The proofs of the main results which follow also assume that the following property holds:
Distributivity: B(O A b) = B(O) n B(V)
Because we rely on the belief operator as defined from preferences, we need the following
definition and result:
Definition 25 Relation >- is completely ordered if it satisfies, for all f, g, h E F,
(Pl) (completeness): f > g or g > f
(PN) (transitivity): f > g and g > h =* f > h
Proposition 26 (Morris 1996): If preference relations are completely ordered, then the belief
operator reflecting those preferences satisfies distributivity.
Proof. Suppose first that w E B(O) n B(V).
w e B(O) implies that (fA4', g-(¢A^)) >- (f^,g¢ 9A-0, h-O¢)Vf, g,h E F.
w e B(¢) implies that (fY^,g ^ -, hO) =W (f4ONO,h,(A^P))Vf, g,h E F.
Then by transitivity, (fY^N, g-O(A')) >,W (f^ h,,(AO))Vf, g,h e F. Thus, w E B(¢ A ).
Conversely, suppose that w E B(q A 4).
Then (fA^, g9-(A4)) ~, (f^,h_ hOA,^))Vf, g,h e F.
This implies (f4^, fOA-,'1, g-,0) >,w (4A^, fOA-',,, h-O)Vf, g,h E F.
That is, (f, g--,) w (fo, h-,)Vf, g,h e F. Thus, wE B(O).
Similarly, w E B(¢ A 4) implies that (fOA¢, f-¢A',g-O 1 ) >Pw (f4A, f-4 , h- )Vf, g, h E F.
That is, (fo,g ,) >-w (fo, h--,)Vf, g,h e F. Thus, w E B(0). m
We will also assume throughout that the preference relations { }~=}en satisfies the following
two properties:
(P3) (continuity) The set {f E F : f >, g} is closed for all g E F.
(P4) (monotonicity) If (f4, h-,o) >- (go, h-,) for some f, g,h e F, then (f•, h'l) >- (g, h'o) for
all f', g', h' e F such that f » g> .
Monotonicity says that if ¢ is considered possible, then the agent will have a strict preference
for any act that returns a large amount when 4 is true over any other that returns a small amount
when ¢ is true, if their returns when ¢ is false are the same. Thus, monotonicity represents an
assumption on how the agent understands the relationship between propositions (about which
he has beliefs) and states (which are the domain of the acts between which he is choosing).
The assumption is that if preferences between some pair of acts imply that € is not null, then
the agent can distinguish between any two acts - functions from states to consequences - which
differ only in terms of how they fare in the event that € is true.
We now turn our attention to agents who are overly certain, holding more implications to
be true throughout the state space then is warranted, not rejecting any implications which do
hold, and ruling out states for which they should allow. The main result of the paper, to which
we now come, concerns such agents.
2.5 Welfare-Enhancing Uncertainty
We have now laid out most of what is needed to state and prove the main result of the paper,
which puts limits on the bounded rationality of an agent whose learning makes him better off
over time. In particular, we will show that such an agent can be deluded, but only in a way
which is consistent across states and time, and that such an agent can become less certain about
the state of the world over time. First, however, we will define exactly what we mean in each
part of this statement.
2.5.1 Weak Valuable Information
Morris (1996) presents a property of preferences called coherence; essentially, this says that an
agent will always prefer to take a state-contingent act, utilizing whatever information he has
about the true state of the world, rather than being restricted to choosing a single act f e F. In
other words, he would prefer to choose his act once he has observed whatever is available to him
to help discern the true state, rather than being forced to choose the ex ante (unconditional)
optimal act. In our setting this may not be the case. In our running example, if getting
rained on is sufficiently unpleasant, Bruce will be better off choosing the constant act 'stay at
home' rather than the state-contingent act when he is unaware of the power source, because
choosing the state-contingent act will send him on his picnic whenever he observes no beacon,
including in the state (r, -lb, -p), where no beacon does not imply no rain. However, Bruce
may nevertheless always be better off choosing a state-contingent act using the information he
has in the present, rather than the state-contingent act he would have chosen in the past.
We will ask the following:
* Is there a single preference relation that reflects the family of relations { }we?
* Using this preference relation, if the agent is allowed to construct state-contingent acts -
which can be thought of as descriptions of what the agent would do at each state of the
world - will a state-contingent act constructed using today's information be preferred to
one constructed using yesterday's information?
If the answer to both these questions is 'yes', we will say that the agent's learning makes
him better off over time.
We proceed formally as follows:
We begin with a decision problem F. Each f e F is a constant act. For each state, and
for each time t, we can define a choice function Cw,t [F] based on the preference relation >,t as
follows:
Cw,t[iF] -= {f eIF: f ,w,t g Vg E }
As in Morris, we can construct the state-contingent optimal act ft*, which is not necessarily
one of the original constant acts in F, where f,,t, the wth element of the vector ft*, is equal to
fw,t for some f E C,,,t [F]. The set of all such acts is denoted Ct [F].
We now characterize the preference relation which will reflect the family {•}•
Definition 27 A preference relation > is a meta-ordering if it is complete, transitive, contin-
uous, and satisfies the following strong monotonicity condition, for all f, g, h E F:
(f, h-w) >.- (gw, h-w) <* f, > g,
This condition assumes that, according to a meta-ordering, there are no null states at all
- and therefore, no null propositions (except, of course, those which are tautologically false,
which belong to no D,). The interpretation is that the meta-ordering represents the ex ante
preferences of an agent who does not rule out any state of the world, or any proposition, as we
have been allowing agents to do throughout the analysis. It is, so to speak, the unconditional
preferences the agent would express if he could view the state space as the modeler does.
Then when we say that the agent's learning makes him better off over time, we mean that
his preferences satisfy the following property:
(P5) (Weak valuable information): There exists a meta-ordering >,such that for each finite
decision problem F, and for every t, there exists ft* E Ct[F] such that ft* >, f for every
f E Co [F] U Ci [F] U ... U Ct-1i[]
The word 'weak' is in the name of this property to distinguish it from Morris' property of
Valuable Information, which is identical to Weak Valuable Information except that the set of
constant acts F is included in the union on the right-hand side of the property. Again, in our
setting there may be constant acts which dominate state-contingent acts; alternatively, we are
here exploring the implications of assuming only that the agent is better off over time, so long
as he uses what information he has.
2.5.2 Delusion
The reason that the agent may be better off choosing a constant act rather than a state-
contingent one is that his current information may include a belief which is incorrect: he
may have ruled out something which is true or, equivalently, believe something which is false.
That is, his beliefs may be deluded. Nondelusion is a familiar property from the literature on
state-space models, where it is commonly called the Axiom of Knowledge:
Nondelusion: B(O) C {w e Q : q E 4%}, for all 0 E ).
The following, also well-known from the state space literature and proved in Barczi (2007),
will be useful for the proof of the main result, and is also of independent interest:
Proposition 28 Beliefs satisfy nondelusion if and only if the possibility correspondence repre-
sented by B is reflexive, with -% C P(w) Vw E Q.
In words, the proposition says that the agent believes something which is false if and only
if he considers impossible something which is true. When this is the case, his beliefs can be
described as being too certain about the state of the world, or overconfident, in such a way that
he makes mistakes because he takes for granted that some states of the world cannot obtain.
If the agent considers impossible a state of the world (or combination of propositions) which is
in fact possible, then it becomes apparent how ruling in states and propositions can make him
better off. This can be true even if the added uncertainty comes with no immediate resolution,
and is in stark contrast to the usual conception of learning which focuses only on the ruling out
of possibilities.
2.5.3 Refinement
Morris (1996) considers the following property of beliefs:
Refinement: For all q e 4, for all w e Q, and for all t > s,
¢ ý P9(w) =:ý € V Pt(w)
where Pt(w) denotes the set of propositions considered possible at state w and time t.
This says that if at some state the agent believes some proposition at time s, then he also
believes the proposition at the same state at a later time t. That is, the agent only rules out
propositions over time; he never rules them in. Again, to allow that agents may learn that
they should not take a non-trivial proposition for granted is explicitly to reject refinement. But
if learning improves welfare, then we can associate failures of refinement with the ruling in of
exactly those propositions about which the agent is deluded. He becomes less certain, but
avoids overconfident mistakes. This suggests that whenever there is a failure of refinement, it
must be associated with a lessening of delusion if it is to improve the agent's well-being. The
main result of the paper, to which we now come, argues that this is precisely the case.
2.5.4 Ruling Contingencies In Can Increase Welfare
In the standard model, learning increases welfare by allowing the agent to rule out more over
time, providing a more precise assessment of the state of the world. Barczi (2007) shows that
ruling out is the only sort of learning possible for an agent who does not suffer from either type
of epistemic negligence. The following result says that if an agent's learning consistently makes
him better off over time, he can only rule propositions in if he suffers from possible impossible
worlds. If his epistemic negligence comes only in the form of impossible possible worlds, then
while he may not be logically omniscient, he satisfies nondelusion and only learns by ruling
propositions out (in particular, he may rule out his excessive uncertainty).
Proposition 29 Assume that belief operator B reflects an agent's preferences {>W}Wn , and
the possibility corresponence P. If these preferences satisfy weak valuable information, then
Vw, w' E Q, and for t > s:
1. If q is true at state w and is considered compatible with L, at time s, then
Sis considered possible at state w at time t:
V¢ e D, and Vw such that ¢ e 4D,, ALw Ps(w')  c E Pt(w).
2. If 0 is ruled out at state w' and time s, and ruled in at state w' and time t,
then it must be ruled out at time s at some state at which it is true:
V¢ E 4, ¢ 0 Ps(w') and ¢ E Pt(w') 4 ¢ Ps(w) for some w such that ¢ E D,.
The proposition says two things. First, if I am deluded and believe that something is false
when it is in fact true, say at state w, then at no point in the past would I have considered
that proposition true when the world looked as it does at state w. The behavioral impact of
this result is that mistakes made due to delusion today would have been made due to the same
delusionary belief in the past. The epistemelogical interpretation is that if I am deluded today,
this reflects a false-tautological belief which I hold today and have always held in the past. The
second half of the proposition says that whenever my awareness information changes such that
a proposition is considered possible in a state in which it would previously have been ruled out,
I must have been ruling the proposition out in some state in which it was in fact true. That
is, a failure of refinement implies delusion. Behaviorally, this captures the idea that increasing
uncertainty can help the agent avoid overconfident mistakes.
Proof. Consider the finite decision problem F = {0, f}, where f yields -1 on the set
{w Et : q E 4,}, e > 0 on some w' V {w E : 0 E 4w}, and 0 elsewhere; we will use this
decision problem in both parts of the proof. Note that this means that f is preferable to 0
when the state is w', worse than 0 when 0 is true, and indifferent in other states.
For the first part of the proposition, suppose not: suppose that 0 A L, E Ps(w'), but
SPt(w) for some w such that 0 E 4%. In words, that is, suppose that at time s and state w',
it was considered possible that both 0 and all the propositions in L, were true, but that 0 is
not considered possible at time t and state w. q A L, E Ps(w') =- 0 E Ps(w) by Proposition
23, and so we have q E Ps(w) n Ps(w') (if 0 is considered compatible with state w at time s, it
must be considered possible when the true state is w at time s).
q A L, E Ps(w') also implies L, = Lu,, by Proposition 22. Suppose as well that L,, C
Ps (w"). Then, again by Proposition 22, Lw, = L,,,. This in turn means that our hypothesis
0 A L, E Ps(w') implies 0 A L,, E Ps(w') when L,, C Ps (w"). Then, by Proposition 23, we
have in this case E Ps(w").
Together, this means that 0 is considered possible at both w and w', and that at any other
state w", if L,, (the 'good' state) is considered possible, then 0 (the 'bad' proposition) must also
be considered possible. This tells us that we have that 0 ,s fVw E Q, and thus 0 ECS[F].
We have also that f >,t 0 because 0 ý Pt(w) by hypothesis. But for e sufficiently small, this
means that, regardless of beliefs at other states at time t, 0 ,, g for any g E Ct[.[F]. Therefore,
weak valuable information fails.
For the second part of the proposition, once again, suppose not: suppose that 4 P, (w')
and q E Pt (w'), but that 0 E P, (w) as well, for all w such that 0 E 4). Then, at time s,
we have 0 >,,s f for all w such that q E 4), and f ,s 0. At time t, the only change in
preferences which our assumptions imply is 0 ~,w,t f. Note that preferences were 'correct' at
time s, so whether they change or not from time s to time t cannot improve the agent's choice
according to >,. But the change in preferences at w' has made the agent unambiguously worse
off; therefore, weak valuable information fails again. *
This result is the analog to Morris' finding that valuable information implies refinement.
It should be noted that it is not sufficient to relax valuable information to weak valuable
information, remaining in the standard state-space model employed by Morris, in order to gain
this result; Morris' proof that valuable information implies refinement does not rely on coherence
(the property that state contingent acts are preferred to the original constant acts). When the
agent is capable of describing each state (i.e. with full awareness), refinement - i.e., improving
information over time - means that uncertainty should fall over time, and that therefore once
something has been ruled out at a given state, it should never be considered possible again.
But with unawareness this is plainly not true. In our example, it was a bad thing that rain was
not considered possible when no beacon was seen; awareness of the power source means that
rain comes to be considered possible in states with no beacon. While this is a mistake when
there is in fact no rain coming (the power source is on, for instance), this is helpful when there
is no beacon only because the power is off. If getting rained on is sufficiently bad, the agent
will be better off having this new degree of uncertainty in his life, as it will protect him from
acting on information which is less certain than he thinks. The decision problem in the proof
exemplifies what is meant by 'sufficiently bad'. The main point here is that part of learning is
the learning of new questions, sometimes unaccompanied by new answers, and that this sort of
uncertainty-increasing learning is valuable.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has extended the work of Morris (1996) to boundedly rational agents, who increas-
ingly benefit from using their information over time but need never be better off using their
information instead of choosing a constant act. They can believe that which is false, and
can rule in propositions having previously ruled them out; indeed, it is all to their good that
they do so, because they thereby avoid overconfident mistakes. This sort of learning stands
in contradiction to the usual conception, which holds that agents' information improves with
time only insofar as they are able to rule states out. The result was obtained via the greater
flexibility of a propositional model (relative to a state space model), in which we were not forced
to assume that the agent knows how to group propositions according to state.
The example with which we began naturally leads us to interesting questions about learning.
How does Bruce react to the downpour? Does he simply observe that, contrary to his previous
beliefs, the state (r, -b) is possible, and add it to his state space? What sort of probabilistic
beliefs does he adopt regarding that state, or regarding the others (and how can we represent
this sort of updating)? We would like to think that Bruce could come to a better understanding
of the world, including the unaccounted-for power source; how would he do this, and how can
we represent the updating process? What would lead him to this new dimension of uncertainty
in particular, as opposed to other possibilities (such as the possibility that the beacon is being
controlled by a practical joker who likes to see him get wet, or that his sight is being manipulated
by an evil demon with the same goal)? We have seen that epistemic negligence of some form is
required for this process to take place at all; in particular, the agent must suffer from possible
impossible worlds if his learning is such that it consistently makes him better off over time.
It seems clear that what must take place is a reevaluation of the logical connections believed
by the agent to hold among the propositions of which he is aware, and an attempt to bring in fur-
ther propositions that would help him to make sense of a change to these connections. He might
reason, "I believed that seeing no beacon implied that no rain was coming; this is plainly false.
So what third proposition, previously unconsidered, was true today which, when true, means
that rain doesn't imply beacon? Alternatively, what was I taking for granted which, when
true, means that my belief that rain implies beacon is correct - but which need not be true?"
Addressing these issues would require specification of logical relationships among propositions,
and a process by which Bruce would learn these more accurately. But as Peter Gtrdenfors
has written, 'it is conceivable that our intuitive judgments of epistemic entrenchment 15 can-
not be explained on the linguistic level in terms of the epistemic status of the sentences that
express our beliefs but that more fundamental prelinguistic notions are necessary for a fuller
understanding of such judgments.' 16
Possible applications of this research include understanding innovation, particularly in col-
laborative settings. A vital factor to research is asking new questions; firms and universities
might wonder if there are factors under their control which can help their researchers to do
so, and the answer could contribute to the growing literature on innovation in private and/or
15 Gardenfors' book Knowledge in Flux (1988) offers a model which may help answer the questions being asked
here. In his model, the outcome of belief revision following the presentation of a new fact is determined by an
ordering over the other propositions believed by the agent called epistemic entrenchment - roughly, 0 is more
epistemically entrenched than 0 iff belief in 0 is abandoned when it becomes clear that 0 A cannot be true.
Gdrdenfors' results, however, do not directly apply to cases where a fact is learned which contradicts the set of
beliefs held by the agent - i.e., a zero probability event.
16Gardenfors, Knowledge in Flux, p. 93.
public settings. There is often thought to be a direct relationship between this line of research
and incomplete contracting, although that is a commonly mentioned application for theories
of unawareness. What separates these two questions, I believe, is that incomplete contracts
are examples of ways that agents deal ex ante with unawareness, whereas I am more interested
with the ex interim and ex post learning process. One possible question would be how con-
tracts evolve over time, as some unforeseen contingencies actually obtain, become salient, and
influence renegotiation.
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Chapter 3
Jointly Determined Reputation and
the Market for Expert Advice
3.1 Introduction
The failure in recent years of highly reputable agencies such as S&P, Moody's and Fitch to draw
attention to problems at the firms they are charged with evaluating, including such noteworthy
examples as Enron, Tyco, Adelphia and WorldCom, has called into question the value of expert
advice. In the wake of such scandals, attention immediately turned to the possibility of
collusion between rating agencies and the firms they rate - collusion which has long been
deemed theoretically unlikely due to the importance of a reputation for honesty to financial
experts. Interestingly, government reports (SEC 2003, U.S. Senate 2002, 2003) found little
cause for concern about outright collusion; rather, they found fault with the amount of effort
federally endorsed financial watchdogs put into the accuracy of their ratings, citing in particular
low levels of staff and inadequately qualified ratings analysts. In light of these findings, this
paper develops a theoretical model designed to address the question of whether reputational
concerns can discipline providers of expert advice to exert costly but accuracy-enhancing effort.
The primary insight provided by this paper is that the effort exerted by an expert can be
highly sensitive to whether its reputation is determined by its effort alone or whether the firm
it is evaluating also has a costly action available to it, by which it too can influence the expert's
reputation for accuracy. In this paper, the expert's reputation is the belief of other players
- both the firm being evaluated and consumers - regarding the relative probability that it is
a commitment type, that always puts maximal effort into the accuracy of its rating, versus a
'strategic' type, that balances the cost of its effort against gains from bolstering its reputation
for being a commitment type. This tradeoff is familar from the literature on reputation, which
has found that reputational concerns allow such an expert to 'commit' to exerting effort in a
setting where it would be unable to do so were it known to be strategic with probability one.
This paper departs from the existing literature in amplifying this familiar setting to allow the
firm being evaluated, which is known to be strategic, to exert costly effort which can also bolster
the expert's reputation. Its incentive to do so is simple: the greater the reputation of the
expert, the more valuable a good rating becomes to the firm. This incentive, however, depends
on whether a more accurate rating is favorable to the firm in the current period. We find that,
when the effort of the firm and the expert are complements, uncertainty about whether the
firm is exerting effort alters the incentives of the strategic expert to put costly effort into its
rating. Moreover, we find that this change can result in low expert effort when the expert's
reputation is relatively high, by lowering the commitment power delivered by this reputation.
The model developed here is meant to be as simple as possible, capturing the essential
elements of the reputational incentives of experts and firms to exert effort in the market for
advice. Three players - an expert, a firm, and a unit mass of consumers - interact over two
periods. In each period, nature chooses a state of the world, either 1 ('good') or 0 ('bad'),
which may be thought of as the quality of the firm's product. Each state is equally likely
in each period, independent of the state in the other period. The firm learns the state of
the world when it is chosen; the expert does not know the state of the world, but has private
information as to its own type, which is fixed across the two periods. It possesses a technology
which delivers an effort-dependent noisy signal of the state of the world (we assume that it
reports honestly whatever it learns). It may be a 'commitment type', such that it always puts
maximal effort into the accuracy of its signal, or 'strategic', such that it must pay a cost that
is linear in its effort. Neither consumers nor the firm know the expert's type; both share the
same prior belief, and both update by Bayes' Rule using the same information, so that their
beliefs always agree. The fact that the signal is noisy means that neither an accurate nor an
inaccurate first-period rating can serve as a perfect signal of the expert's type to consumers
and the firm.
The consumers have two choices to make, which determine payoffs for all players. First,
they must decide whether or not to enter the market and observe the expert's rating. The
greater the expected accuracy of the rating, the more likely they are to do so. Second, those
consumers that enter choose, conditional on the rating, whether to buy or not buy the firm's
product (in essence, they must guess the state of the world). Payoffs to the consumer in each
period depend on how well their action matches the true state: they receive positive utility if
they buy when the state is 'good' or if they do not buy when the state is 'bad', and negative
utility if they make the 'wrong' choice. The firm, on the other hand, simply gains positive
utility in each period when the consumer buys its product, and nothing if it does not; its payoffs
also increase in the proportion of consumers that enter. The expert, finally, receives payoffs
only as an increasing function of the number of consumers that enter in each period.
The paper first examines the reputational incentives which arise from the model as stated
above, in which the accuracy of the expert's rating varies only with its own effort. This setting
is largely familiar from past literature on reputation, and the insights which arise follow well-
known lines. First, because the timing of the game (described in greater detail below) is such
that consumers decide whether to enter as a function of expected accuracy, without observing
actual effort, the strategic expert's only incentive to exert effort derives from the potential to
bolster its reputation with an accurate rating. So, for example, it will never exert effort in
the final period. But second, by the same argument, we establish that the strategic expert
will never exert full effort in the first period, so long as its effort cost is even slightly positive.
The reason for this is simple. If the strategic expert exerts full effort in the first period, he
behaves exactly as does the commitment type - which is understood by the consumers if he
does this in equilibrium. But this means that an accurate rating is no more likely to signal
that the expert is the commitment type than that he is strategic. With no inference possible
from the first-period rating, the strategic expert faces no reputational incentive to exert effort
at all, and so full effort cannot be incentive compatible. Third, we show that the credibility, or
expected accuracy, of the expert's first-period rating is an increasing function of the consumers'
prior belief that he is the commitment type, as we would intuitively expect. But fourth, we
find that the expert's first-period effort (if it is ever positive) is a non-monotonic function of its
prior reputation. This is easy to understand: when the prior belief is either that the expert
is certainly the commitment type, or certainly strategic, the accuracy of the report can have
no effect on the posterior, and so the strategic expert will exert no effort. Effort can only be
positive when there is a reputational incentive to incur its cost, which requires that the prior
reputation lie strictly between zero and one. We show, however, that the expert's effort always
increases in its prior reputation when its reputation is low, and that the range over which it does
so approaches the full range of prior reputations as its signal becomes increasingly noiseless.
The model is then amplified to one of jointly determined reputation, such that the accuracy
of the expert's rating is made to depend not only on its effort, but on a costly effort decision
on the part of the firm. The firm has an incentive to exert costly effort for two reasons. First,
it knows the state of the world in each period, and if that state is 'good', then it benefits in
the current period from a more accurate rating. Second, entry in the second period is higher
following an accurate first-period signal, as this bolsters the reputation of the expert for being
the commitment type. When the state is 'good' in the first period, these incentives are aligned;
they conflict when the state is 'bad'. We assume that the effort of the expert and the firm
are complements, so that the incentives of each to exert costly effort are greater when it is
more likely that the other party is doing so. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions
for equilibria in which the firm plays, conditional on the state, a pure strategy in the first
period, with four main results. First, we show that in such equilibria, the firm never exerts
maximal effort in the first period when the state is 'bad'. Second, we show that, for every prior
reputation, if there is an equilibrium in which the expert exerts a positive level of effort, this
level is unique. Third, recall that reputation has been characterized, throughout the literature
as well as in this paper, as a form of commitment power. We find that when there is uncertainty
about the firm's effort level, the ability of the expert to commit to exerting its own effort is
lessened. In particular, the level of effort exerted by the expert is always less than in the game
in which rating accuracy depends on its effort alone. Indeed, there exists a range of relatively
high prior reputations for which the expert chooses to exert relatively high effort when this on
its own increases rating accuracy, but no effort at all when the firm's effort is required as well.
And fourth, this gives rise to the result that in the model of jointly determined reputation, the
credibility of the expert's advice need not be monotonically increasing in its prior reputation.
The market for expert advice has often been modeled in the past along the lines of cheap
talk (Crawford and Sobel (1982)). Peyrache and Quesada (2005), building on the mechanism
design literature studying the market for expert advice (including Lizzeri (1999) and Albano and
Lizzeri (2001)), motivate the same tradeoff studied here in a model where the expert is known
to be strategic, but may be forced to leave the market if it is found to have lied; this threat
provides it with a measure of commitment power to honesty. The capacity for reputation
to provide commitment power has been at the center of a long literature on reputation in
game theory, beginning with Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) and
continuing in the work of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1991). Benabou and Laroque (1992),
extending Sobel (1985) to allow for noisy private signals, study reputation in the market for
expert advice and show that in a market in which an insider has access to private information
about an asset, and in which other participants can only learn about the insider's honesty via
its announcements, the insider may manipulate prices without ever being fully found out.
Joint determination of reputation has been considered indirectly in much of the literature
on reputation, merely by virture of the fact that the evolution of the reputation of a seller
or an expert depends on the entry decision of other parties. Papers such as Fudenberg and
Kreps (1987), Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), and Ely and Valimaki (2003) have specifically
considered how games of reputation in which only the player with hidden type is 'long run'
differ from those in which all players are 'long run', so that the players without hidden type
internalize the future costs and benefits of information revealed in the current play. This paper
differs from this literature in allowing a long run player without hidden type a richer array of
actions then a mere entry choice. Incentives for such a player - the firm being evaluated, in
the current paper - to take costly action to increase the reputation of a player with hidden type
that brings buyers and sellers together has also been studied in research on two-sided markets,
or forum shopping, such as Lerner and Tirole (2006). The basic dynamic studied there matches
that described in the current paper: costly effort to bolster the forum's (here, the expert's)
reputation is worthwhile because a more reputable forum increases the willingness to pay of
consumers and/or the size of the market the seller faces.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I present the model and the
timing of the game in more detail. In section 3 I consider a simplified version of this model,
in which only the expert's effort impacts rating accuracy, as a benchmark. The equilibria
characterized in this section follow familiar results from the literature on signaling games of
reputation. In Section 4 I return to the full model, in which both the expert and the firm
must exert effort in order to generate accurate ratings. I characterize necessary and sufficient
conditions for equilibria in this model, and contrast these equilibria with those in the game of
expert-determined reputation. In particular, I focus on how expert effort and the credibility
of the expert's rating differ, both in their levels and in their relationship to prior reputation,
from effort and credibility in the simpler model. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Basic Setup: Reputation Determined by the Effort of the Expert and
the Firm
Consider a two-period game played between a unit mass of consumers, a firm, and an expert.
In each period, nature chooses a state of the world, wt e {0, 1}, where each state is equally
likely in each period, independent of the state in the other period. The consumers and the
firms both receive payoffs as a function of a decision taken by the consumer, d e E {0, 1, 0}; 0
represents a costless exit option, whereas 0 and 1 represent entry plus a prediction as to the
state of the world. The consumers' aim is to correctly guess the state of the world: his period-t
utility is equal to 0 if de = 0, v if dt = wt, and -v if de # wt, dt e {0, 1}. The firm, on the other
hand, always prefers that the consumer take a particular action; it earns period-t utility of S if
de = 1, and 0 otherwise (we can think of dt = 1 as a decision to 'buy' the firm's product).
The consumers' entry decision is determined both by their belief about their prospects for
predicting the state of the world (aided by the expert, whom we have yet to describe) and by a
location parameter a - U[0, 1]. We assume that the market is similar to the Hotelling model
of competition on a line, but the firm does not choose its location. It is exogenously located
at the point 0 on the segment [0, 1]. While, as mentioned, dt = 0 is costless to consumers,
they must pay 'transporation cost' at to take a decision de E {0, 1}. Suppose, then, that all
consumers share a common expectation that 'entry' will result in utility p. The proportion
of consumers who enter is then Pr(p , at) = P. As we shall see, p is directly related to the
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expected quality of the information provided by the expert. Of course, if the consumers have
no information other than their prior, they expect utility of 0, and none will enter. Moreover,
because all consumers share the same beliefs, all that do enter will either choose dt = 1 or
dt = 0; this means that the firm's payoff is either 0 or s in each period, depending on thet
consumers' belief about the state, which is determined using the common prior that each state
is equally likely, and the information gained from the report of the expert. The expert's payoffs
are very simple: it earns utility 1 for every consumer who enters, giving it R for the period.t
The model is intended to capture as simply as possible the following:
* Consumers are more likely to enter the market when they believe the expert provides
better information (a belief which is correct in a Bayesian equilibrium).
* Firms gain when more consumers enter, but also gain when they choose dt = 1, regardless
of the true state. There is thus a tradeoff for firms between the accuracy of the expert's
report, which can increase entry in the second period, and the desire to get a 'good' rating
independently of the state.
In each period, the expert issues a report on the state of the world, rt E {0, 1}. Both the
expert and the firm have available to them a costly action which can increase the accuracy of
the report. We will model the expert's costly action in period t as the choice of an effort level
Pt e [0, 1]; the firm will choose an effort level qt e [0, 1]. The cost of effort is linear: the expert
loses utility of pt¢, while the firm's cost is qtP, for some q, 0 E R+. We assume that the efforts
of the two players are complements. In particular, the expert's report in period t is accurate
with probability + ptqt(Or - ), where < ir < 1 (it must be greater than ½ for the consumer
to have any expectation of positive utility from following its recommendation). If ptqt = 0,
the rating provides no more information than the consumers' prior on the state of the world.
Thus, the effort of both players is necessary to provide any information.1
We will assume that, at the beginning of each period, the firm knows the true state of the
world, while the expert does not. This allows for the firm to behave in a state-dependent way.
1 To motivate this assumption, consider that while the expert must exert effort to learn about the firm, the
firm can exert effort to make information about itself as transparent as possible to the expert. Congressional
and SEC reports following the Enron scandal, for example, reflected more concern about the opacity of Enron's
financial reporting, and the lack of effort on the part of both rating agnecies and Enron itself to produce clear
information upon which to base ratings, than about explicit corruption.
The expert will possess private information about its own type: commitment or strategic. We
will assume that the commitment type always chooses Pt - 1. A strategic expert, on the other
hand, has the payoffs we have already described: P in each period, minus ptq if it chooses tot
exert effort of Pt in that period. Its incentive to exert effort, of course, arises from the fact
that the more strongly consumers believe that it is the commitment type, the more credible its
report will be, and the more consumers will enter. The expert's reputation will be represented
by the parameter pt E [0, 1], the probability that consumers and firms attach to its being the
commitment type. The consumers and firm begin the game with the common prior J1, and
reputation evolves by Bayes' Rule.
Before we summarize this discussion by giving the timing of the stage game, note a feature
of this model. This can be thought of as a game of both signaling and signal-jamming. Most
of the past literature on reputation has restricted itself to signaling games, in which a player
with a type known only to itself can take actions, usually at some cost, to signal to other players
that it is of some favorable type (whether efficient or inefficient, weak or surly, etc.). Other
literature has considered signal-jamming, or career concerns, where the player with the hidden
type does not himself know what it is, but can again take actions to manipulate or 'jam' the
inference process of other players concerning that type. In the current model, both are taking
place. The expert knows its type, and can signal that it is the commitment type by exerting
effort and increasing the accuracy of its report. The firm has the same belief as the consumer
regarding the expert - both its prior and all subsequent posteriors - but it can also take a costly
action which increases the accuracy of the expert's report, jamming the signal provided when
the state is realized and the truth or falsity of the report is observed. Its incentive to do so is
provided by the stake it has in the reputation of the expert, an increase in which encourages
entry.
Of course, there is no perfect signal of either type. Recall that if both players exert effort,
the accuracy of the report is r < 1. Thus, a commitment type expert will not always deliver
an accurate report, even when the firm exerts effort. The only pieces of information on which
the consumers or the firm can base their posterior beliefs are the equilibrium levels of Pt and
qt, the report, and the actual state, which is revealed at the end of each period.
3.2.2 Timing
The full timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the type of the expert, where the probability of 'commitment' is A,. This
type is fixed throughout the full game.
2. Nature chooses the state of the world Wi e {0, 1}, with each equally likely, independent
of the state in any other period.
3. Given its belief about the credibility of the expert's report, the consumers decide whether
or not to enter. At the same time, the firm and the strategic expert decide on effort levels
ql and pl, at cost q10 and pi¢, respectively.
4. The report ri E {0, 1} is issued, with accuracy 1 + piql(r- 1).
5. Those consumers who entered follow the recommendation of the report, choosing dl -= rl.2
6. The true state is revealed and stage payoffs are realized. Posteriors on the expert's type
are generated according to Bayes' Rule, if possible. We assume that all players observe
the report and true state, and update at this point, even if they did not enter at stage 3.
Stages 2-6 then repeat. There is no discounting across periods.
3.2.3 Inference across periods
Let 7r and p be given, and consider the evolution of beliefs. Suppose that in equilibrium, the
expert exerts effort pt and the firm exerts effort q~wt when wt = w E {0, 1}. Then following a
stage in which wt = w, the consumers and the firm share the same posterior belief 1', equal to
2Note that nothing has changed between stages 3 and 5 to affect consumers' belief about the credibility of
the report. Denote by , the probability of an accurate report given state w; then the credibility of the report
is I(ro + E1). Because there can only be entry if this is greater than , it must be the case that -o > 1 - ý1
and ;1 > 1 - Ro, and hence that the consumer always believes that the state is more likely to agree with the
report than not.
/+i if ri = w and y, if ri = w, where
=[qw)t7r + 1(1 - _ /-4[qwtr + 1(1 - qwt)]
=,{1-[q~t7r + 1(1 - qwt)]} 1t{1 -[qwtr + 1(1 - qwt)]}1 - {p[qtr + 1(1 - 9wt)] + (1 - [ptqer + (1 - ptqwt)]1 - ,
Note that 7 is the probability of an accurate report, given the state. The credibility of the
report in the mind of the consumers, who do not know the state when they make their entry
decision, is 7 = (~o + 7 1). Of course, p+ > p t1-.
In the notation that follows, we will refer to first-period reputation, or the common prior
shared by consumers and the firm, as pLj; the common second-period posterior will be denoted
/12. We may also refer to the posterior as p/ when we want to make specific reference to the
posterior belief given a prior of 1zL and an accurate first-period report, or as pi when we want
to denote the posterior given /pi and an inaccurate report.
3.3 Analysis of the Model with Reputation Determined by Ex-
pert Effort Alone
Before solving for the equilibrium of the game we have described, let us characterize equilibrium
in a simpler setting as a benchmark: the game of expert-determined reputation. The results
of this section follow the well-known literature on reputation effects in finite-horizon games.
3.3.1 The Second Period
By the game of expert-determined reputation, we mean a game in which only the expert's
effort is necessary to enhance the accuracy of the report, and the firm either does not or cannot
influence the reputation of the expert. Suppose that the game is as described above, but the
firm has no costly action to take,3 and the accuracy of the report is ½ + pt(7r - ) when the
expert chooses effort level Pt, again with cost pt1 (for the strategic expert). Then suppose that
the expert begins the period with reputation lt. Given this, the credibility of the expert's
3 This takes the model set out in the previous section and fixes qt = 1 in both states of the world and for
t = 1,2.
report is
t = /t#r + (1A- t)[2 + Pt(r -1)
and the expected utility to the consumer who enters is
Pt = 'tv - (1 - 't)v = (2't - 1)v
It is important to note that while Pt is determined by the expert's considerations regarding
the cost of exerting effort vs. the reputational effects of effort, these considerations are made
with consumers' beliefs about Pt given. Entry occurs at a level of " > 0, a number which is
fixed and represents the expert's current-period payoff, regardless of how much or how little
effort he exerts. For this reason, the expert will exert no effort in the second (and last) period.
He no longer has any incentive to improve his reputation, and cannot affect his current payoff
with his effort, and so will be unwilling to suffer its costs. For this reason, credibility in the
second period is
1 1 1
7r2 =I27+ A2 = + A2 (7r- )2 2 2
and the expert's second-period payoff is simply
P2 (A2) 2vy 2(7r - 2
t t
Note that this payoff is linearly increasing in the expert's second-period reputation.
3.3.2 The First Period
Equilibrium Analysis
The expert's first-period payoff similarly depends on his reputation and on the equilibrium level
of effort he chooses in the first period, which need not be zero if 4 is sufficiently small and the
reputational gain of an accurate report is sufficiently large. If he enters the first period with
reputation A, and, in equilibrium, chooses effort level Pl, then the credibility of his report is
71 = Ajlr + (1 - +) [2 2(r - )
so that his first-period payoff, net of his effort cost, is
p1(,p1) 1 -2v[pl + (1 - pl)pl](-" - 1)P mp)- Plo = 
- Plot t
To find pl, we note that the net return to effort for the expert is
1 [P2(14) -P2( 1']F(pl; /t) - -0 + (7 - ) t P2 t t
That is, he loses ¢ in effort cost and raises the accuracy of his report by an amount of 7 - 1
for every unit of effort he expends. We can rewrite this return as
2v 1F(pi; pl) = -0 + t7 12 +
F(pi; p•) depends on p, through the effect that Pl has on p+ and p-, which can be char-
acterized as follows:
Proposition 30 p+ - P1 is continuous and decreasing in Pl throughout the range of possible
pl E [0, 1], reaching a minimum value of 0 when pl = 1, and a maximum when pl = 0.
Proof. In the model with expert effort alone, we have
+ /1t11r _ /- 7
"r
t1+ -- 17r- + A1- l)[I + p1l(7r -- i)]
_ _1_(1 - 7r) P, (1 - 7)
1- {p + (1 - pl)[I +P1(7r- )]} 1 -
The proposition follows by inspection, as it is clear that 7 is increasing in pi, and that both
P, and pi are continuous in Pi. m
The intuition for this result is simple. The higher is Pl, the more closely the behavior of
the strategic expert resembles that of the commitment type, and the more nearly the expected
accuracy of the strategic expert's reports matches that of the commitment type. What this
means is that when Pl goes up, an accurate report becomes a weaker indicator that the expert
is the commitment type. For this reason, p+ is decreasing in pi. -IL is increasing in pl by
similar logic: as pl goes up, an inaccurate report becomes a weaker indicator that the expert is
strategic, and more likely to be due to the 1 - 7r probability of inaccuracy even when full effort
is applied to the report. Together, these imply that 1p - pi is decreasing in pp. Of course,
this implies that if there is no reputational return to first-period accuracy, then neither will
there be any first-period effort (which will be anticipated by consumers, leading to breakdown
of the market). This has an immediate consequence for the equilibria of this game:
Proposition 31 pl cannot be one in any equilibrium.
The reason for this is that if Pl = 1, p+ = = p, so there can be no reputational
gain to exerting effort. Intuitively, if pl = 1, the strategic expert is behaving exactly like the
commitment type - so whether the report is accurate or not, nothing is learned about his type.
Mistakes are assumed to be the result of the 1- ir probability that the report is inaccurate even
with effort, and since accuracy is just as likely for the strategic expert as for the commitment
type, an accurate rating does not improve the expert's reputation. Note that this result holds
both for the game in which the expert's effort alone determines his reputation, and will hold
as well for the game, analyzed below, in which reputation is determined jointly by the effort of
the both the expert and the firm.
We can further characterize equilibrium by the following pair of results:
Proposition 32 Suppose that the expert begins period 1 with reputation 1p 1. Then if
2v 1 - ) x Al(1 - r)
-t 2 p,7 + (i - it 1 - [ylr + (i - pl)
then the unique equilibrium first-period level of effort pi is zero.
The proof of this is very simple: the expression on the right-hand side of the inequality
is simply the upper bound of the reputational return to effort the expert can achieve when he
begins with reputation pl, achieved when pl is equal to zero. If the cost of exerting effort
outweighs this, then he will be unwilling to do so. This, of course, does not mean that there
will be no entry, as we have set up the model. Entry, and first-period payoffs to the expert, will
be 2v (r-) The strategic expert will put out a report which is right half the time, and so hebe t
will earn second-period payoffs of t with 50 percent probability, and 2v• ý with 50
percent probability, for total expected payoffs over the two periods of 2v(-)[. + (p++ )].
When the condition in Proposition 3 is reversed, it cannot be an equilibrium for the expert
not to exert effort in the first period, but neither will he ever exert full effort, as already noted.
Rather:
Proposition 33 Suppose that the expert begins period 1 with reputation y,. Then if
2v r 1 - __)2 /1___ . i(1 - )
) 7r + i (1- ")½ 1-[pir + (1-pi1)]
then there exists a unique p* such that
1+
2v(r - 1)2 - 1
where p, and p- depend on pl as given in the text. This level of effort pt is the unique
equilibrium level of effort in the first period.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the hypothesis and the fact that a+ - i1
decreases continuously to zero as pl is increased. Because the equilibrium level of p* sets the
cost of effort equal to its expected return, the expert is just indifferent between exerting effort
and not doing so, and therefore happy to do so at the level p*: there is no profitable deviation.
U
Note that the condition in the hypothesis of this proposition cannot be met for all Pi if
S> 0. The reason for this is that there are priors such that p+ - p- is very small, even
when pl = 0. For example, if p = 1 or 0, then p+ = p- = p, for all pl, i.e. there can be no
reputational return to exerting effort because reputation cannot change. It is trivially true,
then, that the equilibrium level of effort p* cannot increase monotonically as a function of the
prior reputation pi: there may exist p* > 0 for some intermediate /, but at some point as pi
approaches one, the expert's effort cannot have enough impact on his posterior reputation to
warrant its cost.
We can show, however, two results characterizing equilibrium of the game in which only the
expert can exert costly effort, with which we conclude this section. The first result says that,
although the strategic expert's effort does not increase monotonically in its prior reputation
throughout the whole range IL E [0, 1], it can be shown to do so through a range [0, 1 - e],
for E arbitrarily small, as ir approaches one. The second result concerns the credibility of the
expert's rating: it is shown that 7 does increase monotonically in 1I throughout the range
[0, 1], so that as the expert's reputation increases, so does entry.
Effort and Credibility
This first result can be restated as follows: as 7r approaches one, the level of prior reputation
I1 at which expert effort is maximized also approaches one. Thus, the expert exerts the most
effort when there is the most to lose. To prove this, we note that given any .1 such that there
is a pi that sets - + - /, and such that f+ - IL- is increasing in p", it must beiapltases2v(7r-½-)2 1 112
that if p' > p., the p' corresponding to .'(i.e., that which makes the expert indifferent between
effort and no effort when reputation is i') must be greater than pl. What we prove, then, is
that as r approaches one, 41 - 41 is an increasing function of 41 on a range with lower bound
zero and with an upper bound that also approaches one. The suffices to prove that the range
on which p* increases in A1 similarly has lower bound zero and an upper bound approaching
one.
aI+
Proposition 34 For any p* < 1, there exists a 7r < 1 such that I - '0 > 0.
/4 1 C14 1 is/Z
Proof. The first term in the expression L - is
7r /117(7r- )12 -P1)
,17r + (1 - 1)(p17r + (1 - p+ ) ) [p1 ir + (1 - A 1)(pi7r + (1 - pl) 1)] 2
which is always positive (the posterior belief is increasing in the prior), and does not vanish as
r --+ 1. The second term, on the other hand, is
i-7r _l_1(_ -- r)( 1  --__r)(1 -- p:)
1 ...[7-  -- (1 -pl)(pl + (1 pl)) )] {1 _ [,4 ,7 (+ - :)(pl " + (1 -p ) )]}2
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which is also always positive but which, on inspection, can be made arbitrarily close to zero
by choosing 7r sufficiently close to one. At this 7r, the desired inequality is established. *
In other words, as ir -+ 1, the reputational gain for an accurate rating tends to an increasing
function of today's reputation. While there is no guarantee that effort is ever exerted (we have
not assumed that 4 is below any particular level), the implication of this proposition is that
when the noise in the expert's signal is low, then if effort is exerted by the expert in the first
period, that effort increases in his first-period reputation: the expert tries the hardest when
he has the most to lose.
Finally, we show that the credibility of the expert's rating increases in his prior reputation.
Although the effort of the strategic expert does not increase monotonically in p/1 across the
whole range [0, 1], consumers nevertheless become more confident in the accuracy of his rating
as his reputation increases. Moreover, this result holds for any 7r, not only in the limit as
7r --+ 1.
Proposition 35 The credibility of the expert's rating, ', increases monotonically in pl1 .
Proof. Recall that, in equilibrium,
1 1
r= Ainr + (1 - Ai)(- +p(ir -p
Because the expert's equilibrium effort choice p* is itself a function of A, we have
8 2 2 2 i8p,
- 1.+ (11 [ opl
= (7r--) 1-pl-+(1-p
2 Op,
We have shown that if 4 is sufficiently high, zero is the unique equilibrium level of expert
effort for all it. In this case, 4L = 0 and 8 = 7r - 1 > 0, satisfying the statement of the
proposition.
On the other hand, if 4 is sufficiently low that p* can be positive in equilibrium for some
level of pl1 , then the sign of - is the same as the sign of 1 -p* + (1 - 1 1) -p . We want to
show that this quantity is always positive, even though we know that a- may be negative.
We will make use of the implicit function theorem to do so. Recall that i+ and Al are both
functions of p,1 and p*. Define, then, G(p.1,p*) = 4 - .L . By the implicit function theorem,
because oG( ,P) = 0 so long as p* > 0, G(pl, ,p) locally defines p1 as an implicit function of .i
at a given equilibrium with positive expert effort. In particular, we have =p *  --o ,pl/u
Therefore, we are seeking to prove that 1 - PT - (1 - 1) ( ' ,,p) is positive.
We know that I8G(p•.,) is negative; now consider O( P)Recall that we can write pj+ as
9, and - as 1-. Therefore,
aG(pl, p) o" 9 [tzir p(1 - ir)
-2 (1 f2 1/
-- _ 1 l 1(_ - ) 8
The first term in parentheses is positive because or > '. The part of the second term within
parentheses is also positive.
Suppose, then, in contradistinction to the proposition we are seeking to prove, that is
negative. If this is the case, then the last term in the expression above is positive, and we can
then say that aG(pj,p*) is positive as well. But if this is the case, then we can unambiguously
r_________ OG j ')/lis 1 stv
say that G(,,p1 is negative, and that 1 - p- - (1 - OG(pp*)/p*j is positive. But we
know that the sign of is the same as that of 1 - p - (1- 9GA) •*])9 contradicting
the supposition that is negative. Thus, by contradiction, we have established that the
credibility of the expert's rating increases in his prior reputation p4. m
The equilibria of the game in which the expert's reputation is determined solely by his own
effort, then, behave in a fairly intuitive fashion. The higher the expert's reputation, the more
credible is his signal and, as r -+ 1, the more effort he exerts to preserve this reputation. We
now move on to consider a game in which his reputation is determined not only by his own
effort, but by that of the firm which he is evaluating as well.
3.4 Analysis of the Full Model with Jointly Determined Repu-
tation
We now return to consideration of the model in which the accuracy of the rating is determined
by the effort of both the expert and the firm. To reiterate, both the expert and the firm choose
an effort level between 0 and 1, where we denote expert effort in period t as pt and firm effort
as qt, and the accuracy of the report rt is ½ + ptqt (r - ).
3.4.1 The Second Period
Once again, we begin by considering the second period. As before, the expert will not exert any
effort in the second period, for the same reason that he did not when only his effort influenced
accuracy: with no further reputational gain available, he has no incentive to exert costly effort.
The firm, on the other hand, may choose to exert effort in the second period. Whereas
the expert's second-period payoffs are fixed by the level of entry, determined prior to his effort
choice, the firm may still have something to gain from exerting effort: if the state is w2 = 1,
the firm prefers an accurate report to an inaccurate one, as it earns SP2 if r2 is accurately sett
to 1, and 0 otherwise (recall that the firm is aware of the true state of the world). Of course,
when the state is w2 = 0, the firm prefers an inaccurate report, and so will not exert costly
effort to make the report more accurate.
We know, then, that p2 = q02 = 0, where qt denotes the effort level of the firm in state w
and period t. Second-period credibility, then, given W2 = 0, is merely ½: even if the expert is
the commitment type, his effort alone is not enough to raise the accuracy of his report. Given
w2 = 1, on the other hand, the firm exerts effort q12, possibly non-zero, and credibility is equal
to 2 + 2ql12(7 - 1). The consumer, then, unaware of the state, considers that the report has
overall credibility of '72 = + / 2 q 12(7r - ). Therefore, P2 = vA 2 ql2(7r - ), and the payoff
the firm stands to gain when the state is w2 = 1, and the report is accurate, is SV2q12(7-)t
The firm's effort is efficacious only when the expert exerts effort of his own, which occurs in
the second period only when he is the commitment type. Further, in this case, the probability
of a desirable, accurate report rises from 1 to 7. Thus, effort level q12 > 0 is attractive to the
firm if and only if
-1 Svu 2 q12 (r - 1_)p2( - - )  9 12•2 t
which in turn is true if and only if
(/2)2(7r _ )2Sv >2 t
- that is, if any nonzero level of effort is attractive, the firm exerts full effort of q12 = 1 (there
is, of course, the knife-edge case where the inequality is an equality, and the firm is happy to
exert any level of effort between 0 and 1). Note that this condition depends entirely on the
second-period reputation of the expert: firm effort will be 1 if and only if
112 > > 0
In contrast to the game of expert effort alone, then, there need not necessarily be entry in
the second period. Because consumers know that the accuracy of the report exceeds 1, and
2'
(equivalently) the expected return to entry exceeds 0, only when the firm exerts effort, and that
it will not do so unless it is sufficiently probable that the expert is the commitment type, entry
will not occur if second-period reputation falls below the cutoff reputation 2- t  -1/2
Second-period payoffs therefore depend on reputation in a discontinuous fashion. Consider
first the expert. His payoffs depend only on entry, which is either zero or ( 7- 1), depending
on p2 ; he suffers no effort cost. That is, if we denote second-period expert payoffs as V2E, we
have
V2E t2 - (  2-) if P2 > 2
0 otherwise
Firm payoffs, on the other hand, are state-dependent. If w2 = 0, the firm will exert no
effort and its payoffs, which we will denote VF , will depend only on reputation:
SV2 (r 1) if A2
0 otherwise
Note that these payoffs are identical to those of the expert, multiplied by S (the firm's scale
factor) and ½ (because the firm earns positive utility in state w2 = 0 only when the report is
inaccurate, which occurs half the time in the absence of firm effort). On the other hand, when
w2 = 1, the firm will exert effort when reputation is high enough to induce entry, and earns
V1F2(A2) = 1 + A2 + 2(7r - 1•S2-z~2,A St (7 - 2) - V) if A2 -! L 2
1 0 otherwise
Note that it can be shown that this is always greater than VoF2 ( 2) when /2 2 -2; this must
be the case, as in state w2 = 1 the firm could guarantee itself payoffs equal to VoF ( 2) by simply
exerting no effort, such that the report would be correct half the time.
The firm's expected return, before it knows w2, is simply
vF(/2) = [½+ !,2(7r- ½)ls-t• (7r- ½)- ½ f" >
0 otherwise
Note that the expert's payoffs increase in its reputation linearly, and the firm's non-linearly
(because its payoffs depend on reputation both through its effect on entry and through the
probability that effort will be efficacious, should w2 be 1 and effort be exerted).
3.4.2 The First Period
We are now in a position to consider the first period. Both expert and firm will choose an
effort level (pi for the expert and q01o r q11, when the state is w1 = 0 or wi = 1, respectively, for
the firm), balancing the cost of effort against its return. For the expert, this return is purely
reputational. Its first-period payoff is fixed, equal to the level of entry, which is determined
prior to its effort choice. The only reason for it to exert effort, then, is to bolster its reputation
and increase its second-period payoffs. The firm, on the other hand, stands to gain both from
the second-period reputation of the expert and, if the state is wl = 1, from an accurate report
in the first period. If wi = 0, on the other hand, it too can only see positive returns to its
effort in the second period; indeed, it expects effort to decrease its first-period payoff.
Equilibrium Analysis
We begin by simply describing the payoffs to the firm and the expert as a function of the initial
prior reputation enjoyed by the firm (yi) and the effort levels chosen by the two players. We
will denote by q'i the expected effort level of the firm, from the point of view of the expert and
1^ =1
consumers, who do not know the state: that is, q1 = 2(qo1 + qil).
Following the same steps we took before to derive payoffs for the expert and firm, we first
note that given p/l, P, qoi, and q11, the credibility of the expert's first-period report is equal to
71 = 2 + [piqoi + (1 - py)piqoi](7r -2) + 2 + [Mlqll + (1 - pl)piqll](r- )
1 1
= + [A,1 + (1 - /)piq](r -22
Then Pi = (271i - 1)v = 2 [Miq'i + (1 - p1l)p•qi](r - 1)v; similar to our earlier derivations,
payoffs (not including effort costs) are -P for the expert, and for the firm, ' when ri = 1 and
0 when ri = 0.
We now consider the effort choice of the firm in each state, taking as given the expert's
effort choice pl and reputation p/i (we will follow this with a consideration of the expert's
choice, but note now that, as before, because the strategic expert's only incentive to exert
effort is reputational, and because L+ = •- = pi when pi = 1, it must be that pl E [0, 1) in
any equilibrium). As mentioned above, the firm's decision takes into account both the direct
effect of effort on first-period payoffs and that via the expert's reputation on second-period
payoffs. If the firm chooses effort levels oq01 and q11, then it expects its effort to be efficacious
(increasing accuracy from ½ to r) in state w' with probability [pi + (1 - i)P1)p]qi. In both
states, an accurate report (weakly) raises second-period payoffs for the firm from VF(p - ) to
V2F(L +) . In state w1 = 1, an accurate report also raises the current period's payoff from 0 to
S, while in state w1 = 0, it decreases the current payoff from - to 0. In state 1 = 1, then,
the firm exerts effort if and only if
[y, + (1 - 1)p1]q11(-r - + V2(p + ) - Vf(pj)] 1 qu110
or
1 8 Pi 
_(L) F(L[1 + (1- pZ)Pl](7r- )[• + V2F(t ) - V2(C I)]
and similarly, in state wl = 0, the firm exerts effort if and only if
1 _.SPl 
-t F(,u+)- V/(A-O)] 
_'
[i1 + (1 - A1)Pl ](7r - ) [- ';+ V2 01 - V2 01
Note that the left-hand sides of these expressions are not constant with respect to the
firm's effort, because the posterior beliefs of consumers and the firm depend on the firm's effort
choice. Consider, for example, an equilibrium in which the firm is unwilling to exert effort when
wl = 0, because the expected reputational gain is insufficient to outweigh the cost of effort and
the greater likelihood that ri will be (unfavorably) accurate. Then the consumers and firm can
learn nothing about the expert, since he can have had no effect on the credibility of the report
with his choice of effort. That is to say, if qol (q11) is zero, then L+ = p- = jt I following state
Wl = 0 (wl = 1). And indeed, it can be shown that for w' E {0, 1}, +1 is increasing, and
is decreasing, in q, i (where ji 1 and 1 denote the posterior following an accurate, and,
respectively, an inaccurate report in state wi). The intuition is that, the more effort the firm
is exerting in each state in equilibrium, the greater the ability of the expert's effort to affect
the accuracy of his report. Thus, as firm effort increases, the signal sent by the accuracy or
inaccuracy of the report grows in strength: an accurate report sends the posterior even higher,
while an inaccurate report sends it even lower.
We will focus on equilibria in which the firm plays a state-contingent pure strategy. That
is, the firm will either exert full effort in both states, zero effort in both states, or full effort
in one state and zero in the other. We will seek conditions in which pure strategy equilibria
exist, and characterize how the effort of the expert differs in these equilibria from the equilibria
of the game in which the expert's reputation was determined by his own effort alone.
A useful simplifying result is that the firm always strictly prefers not to exert full effort when
wl = 0. Some intutition for this result can be gained as follows. Suppose that, in equilibrium,
qol = 1, and consider a deviation to qol < 1. This deviation has no effect on the evolution
of beliefs: whether the first-period rating is accurate or inaccurate, q0o cannot be observed or
inferred, and so consumers update their belief about the expert's type assuming that qol = 1.
The deviation is profitable, on the other hand, in terms of the firm's current payoff, because
the rating is less likely to be (unfavorably) accurate under the deviation than under qo01 = 1.
The deviation is therefore profitable, and the firm will never exert full effort in when W, = 0. 4
More formally:
Proposition 36 For all pl E [0, 1), if qo0 = 1, [/I- + (1 - .21)Pl( - f)[- + V2F ) -01
v•(Ol-)] < V).
V2 0
Proof. Since [p, +(1- .1)p](ir - 1 ) > 0, it suffices to show that - V 1) - V2
cannot be positive with qo, = 1. Recall that
vF("2) 11 -- / 12 A2 1(7 r _ 1)]_"9(7r_ ½ )_ ½ if A2->-2
V2F GL)2 2 2 2 A2
0 otherwise
Which means that
V2F 1)-V2(,g) = { (- 2 ){( -!oI) + (r )[( -)(Z) 2} o2]} if A > I >( it 2 01 1 -)()2 } if 01 - > o1
0 if E2 > IL1 > IL0
Since pi = 2[pij + (1 - pj)p j](r - ~)v, we want to show that
Sv
- (ir- -){-2[lq"1 + (1 - p,)plq'i]} + V2F 04) - V2F(0)
cannot be positive, or that
cannot be positive, or that
f1.- p-) + (7r - _)[(t+)2 - (IL-)211 if p4 > /I : Ei 01 0ol)  )(01) -0(1o2)_ } 01 0 2
1[/01 + (Tr - I)(1o+1)2] if IL1 > E2 > /ol
20 if 0> +i0 > 1 01
2 if /2101 >I01
First, note that the left-hand side of this expression is smallest, and the right-hand side is
largest, when pl = 0. That is, when w, = 0, the short-term loss to effort (gross of effort costs)
4This intuition does not take account, however, of the fact that the deviation lessens the likelihood that
updating will be conditioned on an accurate report - but the proof shows that this second-order effect does not
make the deviation unprofitable.
2[t1j'1- + (1 - p1)pjq'1] >
is least, and the reputational gain is highest, when Pl = 0. This is because when pl = 0, effort
is least likely to actually produce an accurate (unfavorable) report; on the other hand, if the
report is accurate, this sends as strong a signal as possible that the expert is the commitment
type. Further, the right-hand side of the expression is a function of firm effort only through
qo01, since updating takes place when the true state has been revealed as Wl = 0. We have
assumed that oq01 = 1 by hypothesis. The left-hand side of the expression is least when qll = 0,
so that q' = . Plugging in Pl = 0, oq0l =1, and qll = 0, then, we will show that:
/~~ 1i( 0-t1 >l + lr
( - 01) ( - 1) - (ol)2]} if 01 0 01 >- 2
01 > I (01 + )(1 )2 } if 01 > 2 > P01
0 if -2 > 01 > A01
Next, note that the right-hand side of this expression is increasing in 7r: the signal sent
by the accuracy of the report is strongest when the potential for effort to produce accuracy is
greatest. We want to show, then, that the inequality above holds even when 7r = 1. When
r = 1 and qol = 1, however, p01 = 0 (because an inaccurate report can only result from a
lack of expert effort). Therefore, we need worry only about cases where Pol > i01 - 2 or
+o - _2 > 01 (since V2F(+I) - V2F(L0) = 0 if neither of these holds), both of which can be
covered by checking the condition
1 + 1
Al 2 {o01 0•01) 2
Which, again using ir = 1 and q0ol = 1, reduces to
2I > 0
which is true for all p1. m
There are therefore only two types of equilibria with pure strategies on the part of the firm:
those in which the firm puts no effort into the rating in either state of the world, and those in
which the firm puts full effort into the rating when Wi = 1, and no effort when wi = 0.
The former, together with zero effort on the part of the strategic expert, is always an
equilibrium, regardless of pi, or any other parameter of the game. The reason is that if it is
believed that neither the firm nor the expert are putting effort into the rating, regardless of w1,
then no party has anything to gain from exerting effort, either in the short or the long term.
The expert can only gain from improvements to its reputation - but if it is believed that the
firm is not putting effort into the rating, then nothing can be inferred from the accuracy of the
rating, which is expected to be accurate half the time regardless of expert type or effort. For
the same reason, the firm cannot gain in the long run from its effort. Neither can it gain in
the short run, however, because when the rating is expected to be accurate with fifty percent
probability, there is no entry. Indeed, this fact by itself implies that there is nothing to gain in
the short or long term: when there is no entry, nothing is learned and the expert's reputation
cannot change.
We now consider equilibria in which the firm exerts effort in the first period given W1 = 1,
but not when w0 = 0, and compare them in terms of expert effort and the credibility of the
expert's ratings to the equilibria of the previous game, in which the expert's reputation was
determined solely by his own effort. Note that we can think of this previous game as being
just like the game of jointly determined reputation, with q01o = 11 = 1 exogenously fixed.
It will be useful to note here the considerations the players face in deciding whether or not
to deviate from an equilibrium in which qj1 = 0 and q*1 = 1. We have denoted the expert's
second-period payoff as
v2 E(7r-2)if 2 >2
0 otherwise
In the first period the expert knows that there is a 50-percent probability that the state is
wl = 1, and that the firm is exerting effort, in which case its own effort increases the accuracy
of its rating at a marginal rate of (r- 2), at marginal cost . Therefore, it compares 4 to
, (r - )2(+ - ); i.e., it is just indifferent between exerting effort and not doing so when
t 2q 1
2¢
•1+ -- •1:V(Tl"- )2 if 1+4 • >1 - ]122
or
Of course, if <2, then the expert will never exert postive effort.Of course, if p, + < /t22 then the expert will never exert postive effort.
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Characterization of Equilibrium: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions We now
describe the conditions which, given a prior reputation pl, are necessary and sufficient for
equilibria with q*1 = 0 and q*1 = 1 to exist, as well as the level of expert effort p* which arises
in such equilibria. Recall throughout that p* E [0, 1); the expert cannot exert full effort in
equilibrium. We shall proceed by first describing these conditions and their intuitive meaning,
and will then present them formally. These conditions can be described in three steps:
1. First, in any equilibrium with q*1 = 0 and q*l = 1, it is necessary that P,1 be sufficiently
large that some positive level of effort can be incentive compatible for the expert. Two
subconditions must be satisfied in order for this to be the case. First, it must be possible
for an accurate report to result in a posterior reputation high enough to induce effort in
the second period; if this is not possible, there can be no reputational gain to the expert's
effort. Second, it must also be possible for the reputational gain from an accurate report
to outweigh the cost of the expert's effort. If either of these conditions fails, then there can
be no equilibrium with positive effort from either the firm or the strategic expert. If both
of these conditions hold, we say that pi satisfies Condition 1. It is also necessary for
an equilibrium with positive effort that either Condition 2 or Condition 3 hold, described
next.
2. Assuming that pI satisfies Condition 1, we then seek a unique expert effort level p* such
that the expert's marginal benefit to effort equals ¢, his marginal cost, assuming that
an inaccurate first-period report does not preclude second-period entry. Given this p*,
we then check whether it is incentive compatible for the firm to supply full effort in
state wl and, whether, in fact, the posterior following an inaccurate report, and given
p*, allows for entry in the second period. If both of these are true, then the designated
p, and q 1 = 0, q*1 = 1 comprise an equilibrium. In this case, we say that Pi satisfies
Condition 2. Condition 1 and Condition 2 are jointly sufficient for an equilibrium with
p > 0, qO1 = 0, and q* = 1.
3. If p, satisfies Condition 1, we can also seek a unique expert effort level p* such that the
expert's marginal benefit to effort equals 4, his marginal cost, assuming that an inaccurate
first-period report does preclude second-period entry. Given this level of effort, we then
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check whether qj1 = 0, q*1 = 1 is incentive compatible for the firm, and whether, in fact,
the posterior following an inaccurate report, and given p*, does not allow for entry in the
second period. When both of these are satisfied, we will say that A, satisfies Condition
S. Condition 1 and Condition 3 are jointly sufficient for an equilibrium with p* > 0,
qO = 0, and q*l = 1.
It will be shown below that Conditions 2 and 3 are mututally exclusive: therefore, if a
given 1L1 supports an equilibrium with positive firm effort, there is only one such equilibrium
associated with this level of prior reputation.
To summarize:
* Either Condition 1 and Condition 2, or Condition 1 and Condition 3, are jointly sufficient
for an equilibrium with p* > 0, q*1 = 0, and q*1 = 1.
* In any equilibrium with p* > 0, qA1 = 0, and q*, = 1, it is necessary that either Condition
1 and Condition 2, or Condition 1 and Condition 3, be satisfied.
* Condition 2 and Condition 3 are mutually exclusive.
We now present these conditions and equilibria in more detail. We will denote by 4 (p')
(respectively, p (p1)) the posterior reputation of the expert following an accurate (respectively,
inaccurate) report in an equilibrium with q*1 = 0, q*1 = 1, and expert effort of pl. Moreover,
recall that
sbt (1
-2 Sv kr-1/2)
Then equilibrium of the game of jointly determined reputation is characterized as follows:
Proposition 37 Consider the following three conditions:
(Condition 1) p
~ 
> max{IALB1, LB2}, where
/1 LBl 1
¢t
ALB2
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(Condition 2) p (0) - / (0) > 20t
and
p, satisfying (pt) - /- (p;) = 5_)satisfies
1Sv 1 1 +
2 t ,t-i (pt)) + (ir - 2 1 2  1 2
and also satisfies p- (p*) - 2
(Condition 3) p* satisfying t+ (p*) = . satisfies
1Sv 1 1
1 v(r- 1 ) [ts (p*) + (7r - 1)(/.t+(P*)) 2] Ž >2 t 22
and also satisfies I (p*) </ •2.5
Then we have the following:
1. Conditions (1) and (2) are jointly sufficient for an equilibrium to exist with qj1 = 0, ql =
1, and p* > 0. We will say that 1L which satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) support equilibria
in which second-period entry is not precluded by an inaccurate first-period report.
2. Conditions (1) and (3) are jointly sufficient for an equilibrium to exist with qg1 = 0, q*1 =
1, and p* > 0. We will say that Az which satisfy Conditions (1) and (3) support equilibria
in which second-period entry is precluded by an inaccurate first-period report.
3. Conversely, for an equilibrium to exist with qj1 = 0, q*1 = 1, and p* > 0, it is necessary
that either Conditions (1) and (2) or Conditions (1) and (3) hold.
4. If p4 satisfies Conditions (1) and (2), and p" satisfies Conditions (1) and (3), then
Ai >A
The last point of the proposition tells us that, for a given p 1, if an equilibrium exists with
qOl = 0, q*l = 1, and p* > 0, then it is the unique such equilibrium - or, in other words that
5 The reader may have expected p (0) _ "' to have been part of this condition; note, however, that this
is part of Condition 1, which is necessary for all equilibria with positive effort.
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the sets of prior reputations that satisfy Conditions (1) and (2), and that satisfy Conditions (1)
and (3), are disjoint.
We show the first three points of the proposition by means of an algorithm which, for every
1L1, checks first that an equilibrium qj1 = 0, q*1 = 1, and p* > 0 is possible and then, assuming
that qO1 = 0 and q*1 = 1, derives the implied effort level of the expert, and finally checks
whether qj1 = 0, q*1 = 1 is incentive compatible for the firm, given the expert's effort.
Having done so, we will prove the final point of the proposition separately.
Characterization of Equilibrium: Identifying Expert and Firm Effort Levels That
Satisfy Equilibrium Conditions First, the algorithm:
1. Condition 1 is necessary for equilibria because if it fails, 1z is either not sufficiently large
that entry in the second period is possible - in which case, the expert faces no reputational
incentive and will never exert effort in the first period - or not sufficiently large that the
expert's reputational incentive may outweigh its marginal effort cost.
Condition 1 is derived as follows:
Recall that, in the second period, if 2 <2 - svt 1/2), then firm effort and entry
will be zero. Recall also that p+(pl) is decreasing in pi, such that it is greatest when
pl = 0 and least, equal to pl, when pl = 1. If, then p+(0) < L2, then there can be no
entry in the second period - and therefore the strategic firm gains nothing from its effort,
and will never exert any. That is - assuming oq01 = 0, q1 - 1 - suppose
A1 (0) - /-11 (7r-) < L 2
Al < E2 _ =AB
-2
Then there can be no effort from the firm in the first period. But this means that there
will be no entry, and that q11 = 1 is not incentive compatible for the firm; in this case, the
unique equilibrium has neither the firm nor the expert exerting effort in the first period.
This can come about for a second reason as well. Even if + (0) ? -,2' it may not be the
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case that the expert's effort is worth the cost. In particular, if
pjr 20t+ (0) = <+ ILI (r-_ v(- 1)2
kt
IL < 2F LLB2
then the marginal benefit to the expert's effort cannot outweigh its marginal cost.
Thus, if u1 < max{f ILB1, tLLB2}, then no level of effort is incentive compatible in the first
period for the expert. But given this, neither is it incentive compatible for the firm to
play the strategy of q0oI = 0, qIj = 1. That is, for this lower region of prior reputations,
there is no effort on the part of the firm or the expert, and there is no entry in any part
of the game. Note that ALB1 and 1LB2 are independent of one another, in the sense that
ALB1 depends on O, whereas /LB2 depends on q.
2. Assuming that /11 - max{IsLB, ILLB2}, we proceed to characterize equilibria with positive
effort by the expert, and qj1 = 0, q*1 = 1 on the part of the firm.
We have seen that the firm's indifference condition depends on whether or not inaccuracy
in the first period precludes entry in the second. It is convenient to consider separately
the cases where this occurs and that where it does not. First, we characterize /1 such
that the preclusion of entry in the second period is impossible. This is the case where
-
7(l-r)
2[1 - 7r + Ip2L - 2
If this is the case 6 , then we know that if there is an effort level p* that balances the
expert's marginal benefit and marginal cost, then it can be characterized as the solution
to the equation
2qtt4(4) ~j~(~c)= (7r- .½)2
6Note that satisfying this condition does not imply satisfaction of the condition in step one: this condition
depends on the firm's marginal cost V, while ALB2 depends on the expert's marginal cost 4.
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Of course, we know that the difference on the left is maximized at pl = 0, so ,+ (0) - A- (0)
must be at least as great as for this equation to have a positive root; if it is, thenmustbe t lastas rea asv(7r-½L)2
because the difference on the left decreases continuously to zero as pl increases to one,
there will be some positive level of effort p* that satisfies this indifference condition.
This does not ensure that we have an equilibrium, however. We have been assuming that
q01o = 0 and q11 = 1. We know that the former will be true; the latter requires that the
marginal benefit to the firm for exerting effort in state wl = 1 exceeds the marginal cost.
That is, we must have
1Sv 1 1
-_t( {Cu (Pt) - I(Pi)) +(r- 2 1> 41
where the posteriors represent the updated reputation of the expert following wl = 1,
assuming that qu = 1 and Pl = pi .
If p*, the solution to the expert's indifference condition, satisfies this condition, then the
unique equilibrium with positive effort in the first period 7 is characterized by qA1 = 0,
qj, = 1, and Pl = p*. If it does not, then there is no such equilibrium for this prior
reputation: if we raise PI in order to satisfy the firm's incentive compatibility constraint,
we push the marginal benefit of the expert's effort below its marginal cost, making it
strictly unwilling to exert effort at this level.
3. If p/ satisfies the conditions in step one, such that p > max{I LBl, ILB2}, but not the
condition in step two, such that p, < 2+ 1 , then it is possible that there exist
one of two types of equilibria in which qg1 = 0, q*1 = 1, and the expert exerts a positive
level of effort: one in which inaccuracy precludes entry in the second period, and one in
which it does not (but note that the fourth point of the proposition implies that only one
may exist for a given Api). We can characterize these as follows:
(a) First, we can find the solution to the equation
20tT s u wi-)
7There is of course always the equilibrium with zero effort on the part of the firm and expert.
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just as in step two. Having found its solution, however, we must check two condi-
tions. First, it must be the case that -(p_) > M 2. The p* we have found is indeed
a candidate for an equilibrium only if this is the case; if it is not, then inaccuracy
precludes entry in the second period and the above condition does not describe the
expert's indifference. Then we must check that
1Sv 1 1I (- 1){I W (p*) - Al-(P_)) + (7- 1)[(A (P*))2 
- (,,i(p*))2 ]} > V)2 t 2 l - 12 1 -1 1
If we satisfy this condition as well, then there is an equilibrium in which pl = p•, ql =
0, and q(l = 1.
(b) Secondly, we can find the solution to the equation
2¢t
Note that the solution to this equation is greater than the solution to the equation
in step 3(a): p > p*. This is again a result of the property that the posterior p+
is decreasing in pl.
p* is a candidate for equilibrium only if inaccuracy precludes entry in the second
period: that is, having found p we must ensure that it satisfies the condition
1P(Pt) < -2 Of course, it must also satisfy p+(p) Ž p 2  If it fails either of
these, then the equation to which it is the solution does not describe the indifference
condition of the expert. If it does, we must still check that the firm's effort is
incentive compatible. The condition to check now becomes
+Sv 1 11 S(- ( ){7(-) + (7 - 1)(A+(p*)) 2} _> V
2 t 2 2 11
which differs from the firm condition in step 3(a) because inaccuracy precludes entry
in the second period. If p satisfies this condition, then there exists an equilibrium
with Pl = P*, q01 = 0, and qll = 1.
The preceding algorithm will identify equilibria that exist for every level of prior reputation
A,. It is not immediately obvious, however, that there is no more than one equilibrium with
107
positive effort for each pl; in particular, we may wonder whether, for a given p/l, we will be able
to find an equilibrium following the steps in 3(a) and another by following the steps in 3(b).
In fact, we will not: there is no more than one equilibrium with positive effort for each M1. We
can, indeed, show something stronger: that the equilibria found in step 3(a) are supported by
a set of p, which are all greater than the p,1 that support equilibria found in step 3(b). This
is the content of point (4) of the proposition above, which we now prove.
Proof of Point (4) of the Proposition. We want to show that if p4 satisfies Conditions
(1) and (2), and p" satisfies Conditions (1) and (3), then p/ > 1•. That is to say, /4 supports
an equilibrium in which second-period entry is not precluded by an inaccurate first-period
report, while p" supports an equilibrium in which second-period entry is precluded by first-
period inaccuracy. Note that a necessary condition for inaccuracy to preclude entry, given a
candidate equlibrium level of expert effort 15, is that p"-- (*) < , 2. Similarly, a necessary1z y1) <- 2. Smlryanessy
condition for inaccuracy not to preclude entry, given a candidate equilibrium level of expert
effort p* is that p`- (p*) >M . But we have already noted that for any prior reputation IL,
• > p*. Moreover, we know that the posterior following inaccuracy, p/I-, is increasing in pi.
Therefore, we must have that p"- (p*) < p"- () <  2  p- (p*). Because posteriors after•1 Pl <  1 -P) <- / P-1  s r 
both accuracy and inaccuracy are increasing in the prior reputation, " (p) < '-(p*) implies
that 1 </4, as was to be shown. n
Effort and Credibility
In comparing the various equilibria, some examples of which are depicted graphically in Figures
1 and 2, we can note several things of interest. For starters, whereas we showed that the
credibility of the expert's rating is monotonically increasing in his prior reputation in the game
where only his effort affects accuracy, that is not the case here:
Proposition 38 In the game where both expert and firm effort affect rating accuracy, the
credibility of the expert's ratings need not increase monotonically in his prior reputation.
The fact that credibility can, to the contrary, fall as reputation increases is a result of the
fact that effort by both the firm and the expert can fall from a relatively high level to zero as
prior reputation rises, as depicted in Figure 1.
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Proposition 39 For any iz, the expert's effort in the game in which it alone determines rating
accuracy is always greater than its effort in an equilibrium of the game in which the firm's effort
affects rating accuracy, so long as inaccuracy does not preclude second-period entry.
Proof. This can be easily seen from the indifference conditions for the expert in these two
scenarios. In the simpler game with expert effort alone, this condition is A+ (p*) - j- (p*) =
t)2 whereas in the game with firm effort as well the condition is p (p*)-1(p*) = 2t2v(7_r-1(P )-£ (~ ) - v(7r- ')2 "
As the difference between the posteriors is decreasing in Pl, expert effort in the latter case must
be less than in the former. m
It is, however, possible for effort in the game with expert and firm effort to exceed that in
the game of expert effort alone when 1L is such that inaccuracy in the former precludes entry
in the second period, as depicted in Figure 1.
Comparing Figure 1 to Figure 2 demonstrates the effect of increasing the cost of effort
(similar effects obtain when t is increased, or S or v decreased). Note that in Figure 2, there
are no equilibria with positive effort associated with the upper region of prior reputations:
that is, there are no pI supporting equilibria in which second-period entry is allowed following
first-period inaccuracy. This illustrates an effect of the lessening of the expert's commitment
power that results from the necessity of firm effort: the reputational impact of an accurate
first-period report is less for high it, moreso than when accuracy can be attributed more fully
to expert effort alone, and the expert finds himself better off exerting no effort, rather than
incurring the cost of doing so.
Finally, when the expert's effort alone determines his accuracy, the gap between i1 such
that pl can be positive at a level such that inaccuracy precludes entry and that such that pl can
be positive at a level such that entry in the second period is ensured gives rise to a potentially
large range of prior reputations p1, at which credibility may be quite high, but at which the
expert is unwilling to put any positive effort into the rating. This may imply a gap in the prior
reputations for which positive effort is incentive compatible, as in Figure 1, or it may imply
that positive effort is incentive compatible only for a single (and, it can be shown, convex)
intermediate region of y1, corresponding to equilibria in which second-period entry is precluded
by first-period inaccuracy, as in Figure 2.
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This last phenomenon implies that, in the game where the effort of two parties plays a
role in determining one player's reputation, there are relatively high prior reputations for which
effort is zero, where it would have been high in the simpler, expert-determined reputation game.
That is, where in the game of expert effort alone the expert puts high effort into preserving
a high reputation, it now becomes the case that the expert beginning the game with a high
reputation does not consider the cost of his effort worth the reputational gain it could achieve,
dependent as it is on the effort of another player. Instead, the expert simply 'rests on its
laurels', counting on its high reputation and the fact that inaccuracy can now be attributed
to the lack of effort of the other player. In particular, in these equilibria with pure strategies
on the part of the firm, the expert understands that if its rating is inaccurate when the state
is good, it will be blamed for this - but if it is wrong about the state when the state is bad,
nothing will be learned about its type at all. In effect, the introduction of firm effort with
impact on rating accuracy, and the fact that the firm's incentives to provide such effort and
bolster expert reputation may conflict with its incentive to get a good rating even when wl = 0,
reduce the expert's efficacy in managing its reputation and, therefore, the commitment power
its reputation offers.
3.5 Conclusion
We have studied the incentives of providers of expert advice by contrasting a fairly standard
game of reputation with one in which two parties each can take costly actions that influence
the reputation of one of them, in which both have a stake. Two main differences have been
observed between the games.
First, the game was set up such that when the credibility of the rating is equal to - which is
to say, when the rating is meaningless - consumers expect zero utility from entry and therefore
will stay out. In the game in which the expert's effort alone determines his reputation, this
means that any positive belief that the expert is the commitment type leads to entry. When
the firm's effort influences reputation, however, we need not have entry in the second period
for all positive reputations. Because consumers know that the firm will not exert effort unless
(a) the state in the second period is w2 = 1 and (b) the reputation of the expert is high enough
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that the firm expects the returns to its effort to outweigh its cost, entry does not occur unless
reputation is above a certain, strictly postive, threshold.
Second, we have characterized three types of equilibria in the first period. There is always
an equilibrium in which neither the firm nor the expert exerts any effort at all, and there is no
entry. But there are also equilibria in which the firm plays a state-contingent pure strategy
(zero effort when wl = 0 and full effort with w, = 1) and the expert exerts effort such that its
marginal benefit and marginal cost of effort are equal. These equilibria can either preclude
entry in the second period if the rating is inaccurate, or, for higher prior reputations, they can
allow for entry in the second period, regardless of the accuracy of the first-period rating. There
is always a gap between the sets of prior reputations that support each of these, and in this
gap, the expert exerts no effort at all. The result is that for a potentially large range of prior
reputations, rating credibility - i.e., expected quality - is high, but actual quality is low because
a strategic expert who would be putting high effort into its rating if its reputation depended
only on its own action puts no effort into the rating at all.
This paper has expanded on past work which has sought to understand how an expert can
be disciplined to provide honest ratings, and on literature exploring the workings of reputation
effects. Applied work on expert advice has found that experts are more likely to be accurate
when it is optimal and possible for them to commit to accuracy, even if it is costly to do so.
Commitment power may derive from the threat of forced exit from the market or, as in this
paper, from reputational concerns. The equilibria we found in section 3, in which the expert
alone had the power to impact its own accuracy and reputation, are in line with well-known
aspects of models of reputation. For example, we saw that credibility and effort are likely
to be highest when the expert's prior reputation is highest, such that there is 'much to lose'.
In contrast to this result, we saw that effort and credibility do not necessarily rise with prior
reputation when another player can take costly action to influence reputation. In particular,
because the firm being evaluated may find its incentives to incur a cost for the sake of accuracy
(which increases its second-period returns) in conflict with its desire to get a good rating in
the first period, even when the true state of the world is 'bad', the introduction of this player
reduces the expert's efficacy in managing its reputation, lessening its commitment power. Much
of the past literature has either assumed that reputation effects ensure accurate ratings, or has
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found that experts put high effort into their ratings when their reputation is high, in constrast
to the results of this paper's analysis of jointly determined reputation in the market for expert
advice.
These results shed some light on recent events in which, despite a public perception (en-
dorsed - or perhaps generated - by government certification) that rating agencies overseeing
some of the nation's largest corporations produce credible recommendations, neither rating
agencies nor the firms they were rating were putting sufficient effort into ensuring the accuracy
of the agencies' reports. These events are much easier to understand if firms such as Enron,
Tyco, etc., had available to them costly action (such as more transparent accounting) which
would have aided rating agencies in producing accurate ratings. We have seen that, under
these circumstances, we do not necessarily expect high effort on the part of experts when their
reputation is high, as the reputation of such agencies as S&P, Moody's, and Fitch undoubtedly
was (and is). This suggests that government oversight should pay attention to the level of
effort being applied to the work of generating ratings, both by the agencies and by the firms
being rated, and that it should not be assumed that a high reputation immunizes the provision
of expert advice from low quality.
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Equilibrium Expert Effort Levels and Rating Credibility
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